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Reconsidering Federal Marijuana Regulation 
 
 




The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) prohibits the cultivation and 
distribution of marijuana by placing it in a category (Schedule I) reserved 
for drugs that are unhelpful and dangerous. The CSA has remained 
unchanged since its birth, but numerous states have changed their penal 
code and now allow the sale of marijuana for medical or recreational 
purposes. The current legal status of cannabis is therefore nonsensical 
because, try as they might, the states cannot grant private parties a license 
to violate federal law. Congress needs to address that problem. In so 
doing, Congress should recognize that the CSA approached this problem 
from the wrong direction. People use drugs for medical or recreational 
purposes, and each one requires a separate regulatory scheme. 
Medical Marijuana Use: For more than eighty years, the nation has 
entrusted the Commissioner of Food and Drugs with the responsibility to 
decide whether a particular substance is a “drug” and, if so, whether that 
drug is “safe” and “effective” and therefore can be sold throughout the 
nation. Those decisions are neither moral nor political ones. They require 
the scientific expertise of professionals in the fields of medicine, 
biochemistry, pharmacology, and the like, not the legal knowledge of 
lawyers or the ethical sensibilities of the electorate. Congress should leave 
to the judgment of the Commissioner the decision of how federal law 
should regulate medical-use marijuana. 
Recreational Marijuana Use: The disparities between federal and state law 
demand reconciliation. Congress and the president should assume that 
responsibility and, in so doing, should consider a number of relevant 
factors: What effect would legalization have on marijuana use by adults 
and juveniles? What percentage of people who engage in long-term use 
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will become physically dependent or addicted, as well as suffer serious 
mental problems? What regulatory scheme—the ones governing the sale 
of tobacco or alcohol, or an entirely new scheme—would best serve the 
public? What effect would legalization have on roadway safety, given the 
likely increase in the number of crashes and fatalities attributable to 
driving under the influence of cannabis?  
The bottom line is that Congress should decide whether the benefits of 
recreational marijuana use outweigh its harms, but it should act 
responsibly in answering that question. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The nature of all addictive drugs is to promise bliss but deliver woe.”1 For that 
reason, federal law criminalizes the distribution of various addictive substances.2 
Among them is the plant known as cannabis or marijuana.3 
The federal government has regulated or banned marijuana distribution for 
more than eighty years.4 The first federal law governing its distribution was the 
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.5 Technically, that act did not prohibit the distribution 
of marijuana; instead, it barred anyone from distributing marijuana without 
registering with the federal government and paying a tax.6 Yet, the 1937 act had the 
effect of making marijuana distribution a crime because by then every state had 
 
1    ED GOGEK, MARIJUANA DEBUNKED: A HANDBOOK FOR PARENTS, PUNDITS AND POLITICIANS 
WHO WANT TO KNOW THE CASE AGAINST LEGALIZATION 140 (2015). 
2    See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Swift, Certain, and Fair Punishment:24/7 Sobriety and Hope: Crea-
tive Approaches to Alcohol- and Illicit Drug-Using Offenders, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 39, 42–
52 (2016) [hereinafter Larkin, 24/7 Sobriety and Hope] (discussing regulation of alcohol and controlled 
substances, such as opioids). Alcohol and tobacco cause more morbidity and mortality than controlled 
substances. See, e.g., Nora D. Volkow et al., Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use, 370 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 2219, 2225–26 (2014) (Dr. Volkow is the Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse: 
“[L]egal drugs (alcohol and tobacco) offer a sobering perspective, accounting for the greatest burden 
of disease associated with drugs not because they are more dangerous than illegal drugs but because 
their legal status allows for more widespread exposure.” (footnote omitted)). Alcohol and tobacco are 
sold, not because they are safe, but as a concession to the reality that they are an ineradicable part of 
our culture. See, e.g., Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 
Stat. 1776 (2009); Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 944 F.3d 267, 270–71 (D.C. Cir. 2019); LISA MCGIRR, 
THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2015); DANIEL OKRENT, 
LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION (2010). 
3    For a recent, layperson discussion of the woes that marijuana use can lead to, see ALEX BER-
ENSON, TELL YOUR CHILDREN: THE TRUTH ABOUT MARIJUANA, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND VIOLENCE 
(2019). 
4    For a history of marijuana and its federal regulation, see DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN 
DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL passim (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1999) (1973); RICHARD 
J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA 
PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES (Bookworld Serv. 1999) (1974); MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS: A 
HISTORY (2005); John F. Galliher & Allyn Walker, The Puzzle of the Social Origins of the Marihuana 
Tax Act of 1937, 24 SOC. PROBS. 367 (1977). 
5    Marihuana Tax Act, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970). 
6    Responsibility for enforcing the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 initially rested with the Depart-
ment of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service Prohibition Unit, Narcotics Division. That agency, over 
time, became the Prohibition Bureau, later the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), later still the Justice 
Department Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), and, ultimately, the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration. See THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC AND DRUG ABUSE, 
FINAL REPORT 32–39 (1963); BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 4; Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. 
McLaughlin, The Evolution of Federal Drug Control Legislation, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 586, 599, 605 
(1973) (citing Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1970)). 
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outlawed possession or distribution of cannabis.7 This meant that every federal 
registrant automatically incriminated himself under state law. For that reason, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held the act unconstitutional in 1969.8 The 
following year, Congress replaced that statute with the Controlled Substances Act 
of 1970 (CSA).9 
The CSA took a different approach than the Marihuana Tax Act did. By 1970, 
the Supreme Court read the Article I Commerce Clause10 to grant Congress far more 
authority than the Court had allowed Congress to have in 1937.11 As a result, the 
CSA prohibited the distribution of cannabis by placing it in Schedule I of the new 
drug regulation plan,12 a category reserved for drugs that are, as a practical matter, 
unhelpful and dangerous.13 Congress authorized the U.S. Attorney General to 
reclassify marijuana if, after consulting with the Secretary of Health and Human 
 
7    Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 11 n.14 (2005). 
8    Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
9    Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2019)). The Controlled Substances Act was 
Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Title I addressed pre-
vention and treatment of narcotics addiction, and Title III dealt with the import and export of controlled 
substances. Raich, 545 U.S. at 12 n.19. A “controlled substance” is “a drug or other substance, or 
immediate precursor, included in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this title,” except for “distilled 
spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2018). The Controlled Substances Act incorporates the 
definition of a “drug” from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 201(g)(1) (2019). 
10   See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power] . . . To regulate Com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes [.]”). 
11   See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding unconstitutional a federal minimum 
working age requirement). Compare, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495 (1935) (ruling that Congress cannot regulate under the Commerce Clause the local slaughtering 
and sale of poultry), with, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the constitutionality 
of a federal statute regulating the production of wheat for home consumption). 
12   The CSA assigns drugs to one of four schedules according to a drug’s potential benefits and 
risks. The schedule system came from several international agreements to which the United States was 
(and still is) a signatory that require participating nations to outlaw the distribution of controlled sub-
stances. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
13   See Federal Drug Abuse and Drug Dependence Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation 
Act of 1970: Hearings on S.B. 3562 Before the Special Subcomm. on Alcoholism and Narcotics of the 
S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong. 473 (1970) (Statement of John E. Ingersoll, Dir., 
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (stating that marijuana had “no rec-
ognized medical use”). Schedule I controlled substances have a high potential for abuse, no currently 
accepted domestic medical use, and no accepted safe use. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2018). The 
CSA prohibits physicians from prescribing Schedule I drugs to anyone for any use. 21 U.S.C. § 841 
(2015); see United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975) (holding that a physician can be convicted for 
distributing methadone, a Schedule II controlled substance, outside the boundaries of professional med-
ical practical). 
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Services, he found that doing so would be appropriate.14 No attorney general has 
done so, however, and marijuana remains in the same category that Congress chose 
fifty years ago, as contraband.15 
Since 1996, a majority of states have legalized marijuana for medical and 
recreational use even though federal law still prohibits the conduct that the states 
have removed from their penal codes.16 This conflict has created legal and practical 
problems for the federal government, the states, and private parties, whether or not 
they are involved in the marijuana business, a conflict only the federal government 
can resolve. Indeed, the current state of the law is nothing short of nonsensical. 
My goal in this article is two-fold: to encourage Congress and the White House 
to accept the burden of rationalizing the law governing cannabis, however they 
resolve it, and to suggest an answer to the medical marijuana aspect of the dispute. 
Congress approached this issue from the wrong direction in 1970 because of a 
mistake that it made more than three decades earlier. One year after Congress passed 
the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA).17 The FDCA completely revamped the then-existing 
federal drug regulatory scheme18 and vested in the Commissioner of Food and 
Drugs, aided by his lieutenants in the newly created U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the responsibility to determine whether drugs are safe and 
(via subsequent legislation) effective.19 In passing the FDCA, Congress should have 
revisited the approach adopted by the Marihuana Tax Act and transferred regulatory 
authority over marijuana from the Secretary of the Treasury to the FDA 
Commissioner.20 Congress made a similar mistake in 1970 when the CSA prohibited 
 
14   28 U.S.C. § 811(a)–(c) (2015). The Attorney General has delegated his authority to the Ad-
ministrator of Drug Enforcement. 21 C.F.R. § 0.100(b) (2018). 
15   21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(31) (2020). 
16   As of January 2, 2020, thirty-three states permit medical use of cannabis, while eleven states 
and the District of Columbia also allow recreational use. Marijuana: Effects, Medical Uses, and Le-
galization, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/illicit/marijuana.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/4KJM-PCAL]. 
17   Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675 § 1, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2019)). 
18   Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (prohibiting the manufacture or 
interstate shipment of adulterated or misbranded food and drugs); see, e.g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 
501, 530 (1912). For the background to the 1906 law, see JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECUR-
ING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906 (1989). 
19   See, e.g., CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATE-
MENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD (1938); David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 
1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1939); Drug 
Efficacy Amendment of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (requiring a manufacturer to prove that 
a drug is effective before the company can market it in interstate commerce). 
20   Responsibility for enforcing the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 rested with the Department of 
the Treasury. It was within the bailiwick of the Internal Revenue Service Prohibition Unit Narcotics 
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the distribution of marijuana as contraband rather than directing the FDA 
Commissioner to make that decision.21 
Since the states began to revisit their treatment of marijuana in 1996, Congress 
has made two other, different mistakes. One is failing to reiterate the FDCA’s 
message that only the federal government should set national drug policy. The other 
is failing to recognize that people use marijuana for only two purposes—either its 
alleged medical or known recreational effects—and that each one requires a different 
approach. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the problems created by the 
existing conflict between federal and state law. Part II recommends that, because 
there is no legitimate therapeutic justification for smoking botanical marijuana or 
eating agricultural marijuana-laden food, the FDA should finally assume the 
responsibility it has abjured for more than two decades of shutting down businesses 
that sell smokable or edible cannabis for medical use.22 Part III identifies questions 
that Congress should answer as part of any debate over the future treatment of 
recreational-use marijuana. Finally, Part IV urges that Congress forthrightly rethink 
 
Division, which later became the Prohibition Bureau and ultimately the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(FBN). From 1965 to 1968, the FBN and the FDA Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) operated 
in parallel universes: the FBN had jurisdiction over marijuana and opiates; the FDA, for depressants, 
stimulants, and hallucinogens. In 1968, a presidential reorganization plan merged the FBN and BDAC 
into the newly created Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) and transferred that new 
unit to the Justice Department as part of the CSA. Three years later, the BNDD became the DEA. See 
Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, §§ 2 & 9, 79 Stat. 226, 226-27, 234 
(1965); THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC AND DRUG ABUSE, FINAL REPORT 32–
39 (1963); BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 4; MATTHEW R. PEMBLETON, CONTAINING ADDIC-
TION: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S GLOBAL DRUG WAR 
(2017); Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 599, 605 & n.89 (citing Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 
1968, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1970)). 
21   The FDA should have only drug classification authority. The federal law enforcement agen-
cies, such as the DEA, should have criminal investigatory authority. The latter should be able to com-
ment on the FDA’s decisions, but the FDA should have the power to classify drugs. 
22   Two caveats are in order. First, nowadays marijuana products (perhaps especially edible 
foods containing THC) come in a host of varieties and can be used in a host of different ways. JOHN 
HUDAK, MARIJUANA: A SHORT HISTORY 17–18 (2016) (noting that edibles come in “countless forms 
including cookies, brownies, candies, granola, salad dressing, and even pasta sauce.”); Paul J. Larkin, 
Jr., Marijuana Edibles and “Gummy Bears,” 66 BUFF. L. REV. 313, 318–19 (2018) [hereinafter Larkin, 
Gummy Bears]. My argument below focuses on the traditional practice of smoking cannabis in its 
botanical form. See infra note 76. Second, the FDA has authority only over food and drugs that have 
travelled “in” interstate commerce. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(b), 331 (2018). That element is satisfied 
if marijuana itself or any ingredient or component of a finished product at any time has travelled in 
interstate commerce, however remote that travel might be to the party involved. See, e.g., Scarborough 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1320–
21, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Baker v. United States, 932 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Dianovin Pharm., Inc., 475 F.2d 100, 102–03 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Detroit Vital Foods, Inc., 
330 F.2d 78, 82 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 958, 977 n.23 
(D.N.J. 1981). 
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its fifty-year treatment of marijuana. Whatever its ultimate decision, Congress 
should reconsider the CSA’s approach to marijuana regulation.23 
 
I. THE CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MARIJUANA REGULATORY REGIMES 
 
There was considerable public controversy over the proper treatment of 
marijuana before Congress enacted the CSA in 1970,24 and the debate has not let up 
since then.25 Many people think that the CSA’s classification is entirely 
wrongheaded; others just as vehemently disagree. With the law on the supporters’ 
side and the critics unwilling to “tap out,” the result has resembled a Texas Death 
 
23   Much of the law journal literature on marijuana discusses legal issues, not policy decisions. 
The latter are more interesting. As Professor Kleiman once wrote, “Cannabis legalization will indeed 
provide a solution to the manifold ills of prohibition, but, as James Q. Wilson once observed, the chief 
cause of problems is solutions. We seem to be about to lurch all the way from making the cannabis 
trade a felony to making it an industry, as we did with alcohol and gambling. There are stopping places 
in between, and finding one of them might prevent a good deal of avoidable misery.” Mark A.R. Klei-
man, Cannabis, Conservatively, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 8, 2014, 4:00 AM), https://www.nationalre-
view.com/magazinee/2014/12/08/cannabis-conservatively/ [hereinafter Kleiman, Cannabis Conserva-
tively] [https://perma.cc/5GMJ-QNDS]. For discussion of policy alternatives to complete legalization, 
see JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT 
AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS (2015) [hereinafter CAULKINS, INSIGHT]; Jonathan Caulkins, Against a Weed 
Industry, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 15, 2018, 12:06 PM) [hereinafter Caulkins, Weed Industry], 
https://www.nationalre view.com/magazine/2018/04/02/legal-marijuana-industry-leap-unknown/ 
[https://perma.cc/79W2-FGED]; Jonathan P. Caulkins, The Real Dangers of Marijuana, NAT’L AFF. 
21 (Winter 2016) [hereinafter Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers]; Mark A.R. Kleiman, The Public-Health 
Case for Legalizing Marijuana, NAT’L AFF. 68 (Spring 2019) [hereinafter Kleiman, Marijuana and 
Public Health]. 
24   See, e.g., BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 4, at 222–47; LESTER GRINSPOON, MARI-
HUANA RECONSIDERED (1971); JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION (1970); HERBERT L. 
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 333 (1968) (“A clearer case of misapplication of the 
criminal sanction would be difficult to imagine.”); Geoffrey Richard Wagner Smith, Possession of 
Marijuana in San Mateo County: Some Social Costs of Criminalization, 22 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103 
(1969) (“In the same week that the President of the United States declared an all-out war on marijuana 
smuggling, . . . the Wall Street Journal reported discussion in the business world on the potential profit 
in legalized marijuana.” (footnote omitted)). 
25   See, e.g., Gabriel G. Nahas & Albert Greenwood, The First Report of the National Commis-
sion on Marihuana (1972): Signal of Misunderstanding or Exercise in Ambiguity, 50 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. 
MED. 55 (1974); INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE (Janet E. 
Joy et al. eds., 1999); COMMITTEE ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF MARIJUANA, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., 
ENG’G, & MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS: THE CURRENT STATE OF EV-
IDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH (2017) [hereinafter NAT’L ACAD. REPORT]; OFFICE OF 
NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, MARIJUANA MYTHS AND FACTS: THE TRUTH BEHIND 10 POPULAR MIS-
CONCEPTIONS (2004); DIV. OF MENTAL HEALTH AND PREVENTION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., CANNABIS: A HEALTH PERSPECTIVE AND RESEARCH AGENDA (1997); WAYNE HALL & 
ROSALIE LICCARDO PACULA, CANNABIS USE AND DEPENDENCE: PUBLIC HEALTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(2003); ROBIN ROOM ET AL., CANNABIS POLICY: MOVING BEYOND STALEMATE (2010); Wayne Hall & 
Louisa Degenhardt, Adverse Health Effects of Non-Medical Cannabis Use, 374 LANCET 1383, 1389 
(2009); Volkow et al., supra, note 2. 
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Match. For more than thirty years, critics sought to persuade the U.S. Attorney 
General to move marijuana out of Schedule I, but those efforts uniformly failed.26 
Critics also sought to persuade the federal courts that the government’s refusal to 
reschedule marijuana was arbitrary and capricious or that Congress’s scheme was 
unconstitutional. Those efforts also came a cropper.27 
In 1996, California took the law into its own hands. Voters passed a state 
initiative called “The Compassionate Use Act” permitting the possession, sale, and 
use of cannabis for medical purposes.28 Other states followed that path. Today, more 
than forty states allow adults to use marijuana or one of its biologically active and 
unique constituents (known as “cannabinoids”) for therapeutic purposes. Moreover, 
eleven states permit adults to use marijuana recreationally.29 Accordingly, today 
most states have regulatory schemes directly at odds with federal law.30 
The Supreme Court has twice upheld the federal government’s authority to ban 
any use of cannabis for medical or (by implication) recreational purposes when 
authorized by a state code. Each case involved California law. In 2001, the Court in 
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative declined to construe the 
CSA to include a “medical necessity” exception to the CSA’s strict ban on marijuana 
distribution, even in a state that had approved medical marijuana use.31 Four years 
later, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court rejected the argument that Congress lacked the 
 
26   See, e.g., Michele M. Leonhart, Adm’r, Drug Enf’t Adm’n, Denial of Petition to Initiate 
Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,552, 40,567 (July 8, 2011); John C. Lawn, 
Adm’r, Drug Enf’t Adm’n, Marijuana Scheduling Petition; Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767, 
53,784 (Dec. 29, 1989); Proposed Recommendations to the Drug Enf’t Adm’n Regarding the Sched-
uling Status of Marijuana and Its Components and a Notice of a Public Hearing, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,141 
(proposed June 7, 1982). 
27   See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (upholding Congress's Commerce 
Clause authority to prohibit the local cultivation of marijuana); United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers' Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 494–95 (2001) (holding that medical necessity is not a defense under 
federal law to a charge of unlawfully distributing marijuana); United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 
1065–66 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument that Congress’s Schedule I classification of marijuana is 
unconstitutionally arbitrary); Americans for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (ruling 
that substantial evidence supported the DEA’s conclusion that no well-controlled studies had estab-
lished a current medical use for marijuana); United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 
2006) (ruling that the City of Oakland cannot “deputize” someone to distribute marijuana under state 
law and render him immune from prosecution under federal law); All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. 
DEA, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding DEA’s interpretation of “currently accepted medical 
use” to require (inter alia) “well-controlled studies proving efficacy”). 
28   Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Medical or Recreational Marijuana and Drugged Driving, 52 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 453, 468 (2015) [hereinafter Larkin, Drugged Driving]. 
29   See NAT’L ACAD. REPORT, supra note 25, at 68 & Fig. 3-1, 74. 
30   For popular accounts of the reform efforts, see BRUCE BARCOTT, WEED THE PEOPLE: THE 
FUTURE OF LEGAL MARIJUANA IN AMERICA (2015); EMILY DUFTON, GRASS ROOTS: THE RISE AND FALL 
AND RISE OF MARIJUANA IN AMERICA (2017). 
31   532 U.S. 483, 491–95 (2001). 
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power under the Article I Commerce Clause to regulate the wholly intrastate 
cultivation, distribution, and possession of cannabis for individual, non-commercial, 
medical use as authorized by California law.32 Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-
operative and Raich effectively eliminated any challenge to the federal 
government’s ability to outlaw cannabis nationwide.33 
Nonetheless, since 1996 more and more states have authorized marijuana to be 
used for medical or recreational purposes under their own laws, and an increasing 
number of businesses have entered the business of cultivating or distributing 
cannabis. The elected branches of the federal government have largely been 
bystanders to the continuing growth of the marijuana industry against the 
background of an increasing divergence between federal and state law. The last four 
administrations have alternated between threatening to enforce federal law and 
promising not to do so. The Bill Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations had 
said that they would continue to enforce federal law, at least against large 
distributors.34 The Obama Administration adopted a policy of declining to enforce 
federal law against businesses that sold marijuana in compliance with state law.35 
 
32   Raich, 545 U.S. at 15–31. 
33   The respondents in Raich also claimed that application of the CSA to them violated the Due 
Process Clause, but the Court did not reach that issue. Id.  at 31. (On remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
that argument on the merits. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007).) Had the Court done 
so, it is most unlikely that a majority would have ruled in the respondents’ favor. The Court has afforded 
Congress considerable freedom in deciding how to regulate controlled substances and their harms. See 
N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587–94 (1979) (rejecting an Equal Protection Clause 
challenge to a city policy refusing to hire methadone users); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 
(1979) (rejecting the argument that there is an express or implied exception to the FDCA for drugs that 
can be used to treat the terminally ill); cf. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 422–30 (1974) 
(rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to Title II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251–55 (2018), which excludes repeat offenders from discretionary rehabilitative 
addiction treatment in lieu of incarceration). The federal circuit courts have repeatedly rejected claims 
that the CSA’s Schedule I classification of marijuana is unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. 
Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352–57 (2d 
Cir. 1973). 
34   See, e.g., Barry McCaffrey, Dir. Off. of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Administration Response 
to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997) 
(warning that the “DEA will seek to revoke the DEA registrations of physicians who recommend or 
prescribe Schedule I controlled substances”); Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 28, at 469 & nn.72–
74.  Their bark, however, was far worse than their bite. Trevor Wong, AB 1578: The End of Marijuana 
Prohibition as We Know It?, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 449, 452 (2018) (stating that, from 1996-2009, the 
Justice Department “largely gave a ‘free pass’ to medical marijuana users who complied with state 
law.” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 343 & n.74, 353–54 & 
nn.96–98. 
35   See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, for U.S. 
Att’ys on Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for 
Medical Use (June 29, 2011); Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, for U.S. Att’ys on Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enf’t (Aug. 29, 2013); Memorandum from 
James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, for U.S. Att’ys on Guidance Regarding 
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The Obama Administration, however, seems to have done little to ensure that state 
distributors actually complied with state law.36 During the Trump Administration, 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions repealed the Obama Administration’s hands-off 
policy and left enforcement decisions to each separate U.S. Attorney,37 but the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices have not aggressively enforced the CSA. Congress has watched 
the different administrations dither.38 
Recently, however, Congress has taken some baby steps toward re-examining 
the CSA’s ban on any use of marijuana. Since 2014, Congress has regularly passed 
appropriations bills containing a rider that prohibits the U.S. Department of Justice 
from halting state efforts to experiment with medical marijuana programs.39 In 2019, 
Congress decided to treat the hemp form of marijuana differently from the one that 
 
Marijuana Related Financial Crimes (Feb. 14, 2014); Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 28, at 470 
& n.75 (summarizing the Obama Administration’s policy and listing department memoranda adopting 
it). 
36   See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-1, STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: DOJ 
SHOULD DOCUMENT ITS APPROACH TO MONITORING THE EFFECTS OF STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION 
(2015) [hereinafter, GAO, STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION]. 
37   See Memorandum from U.S. Att’y General Jeff Sessions to U.S. Att’ys, Marijuana Enforce-
ment (Jan. 4, 2018). 
38   Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 322–28. 
39   See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 
538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014); Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-53, § 104, 
129 Stat. 502, 506 (2015); Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-96, 129 Stat. 
2193 (2015); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 542, 129 Stat. 2242, 
2332–33 (2015); Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act, Div. C, Pub. L. No. 
114-223, 130 Stat. 857, 908-20 (2016); Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations 
Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-254, § 101, 130 Stat. 1005, 1006 (2016); H.R.J. Res. No. 99, Pub. L. No. 
115-30, 131 Stat. 134 (2017); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 
135 (2017); Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief 
Requirements Act 2017, Div. D, Pub. L. No. 115-56, §§ 103-04, 131 Stat. 1129, 1139-47 (2018); H.R.J. 
Res. No. 123, Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018, Div. A, Pub. L. No. 115-90, § 101, 131 
Stat. 1280 (2017); H.R. Res. 1370, 115th Cong. (2017); Fourth Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 2018, Federal Register Printing Savings, Healthy Kids, Health-Related Taxes, and Budgetary 
Effects, Pub. L. No. 115-120, Div. B, §§ 2001-2003, 132 Stat. 28 (2018); Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Div. A, Tit. II, § 538, 132 Stat. 348 (2018); Department of Defense 
and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Ap-
propriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, Div. C, §§ 101-103, 132 Stat. 2981(2018); H.J. Res. 143, 
Pub. L. No. 115-298, 132 Stat. 4382 (2018); Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, 
Pub. L. No. 116-5, § 101, 113 Stat. 10 (2019); Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-6, 
Div. C, Tit. V, § 537, 133 Stat. 13 (2019); Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020, and Health Extenders 
Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-59, Div. A, § 101, 113 Stat. 1093 (2019); Further Continuing Appropri-
ations Act, 2020, and Further Health Extenders Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-69, Div. A, § 101, 133 
Stat. 1134 (2019); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-93, Div. A, Tit. V, § 531, 
133 Stat. 2317 (2019); Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 5, 133 
Stat. 2534 (2019). For a discussion of how far that prohibition reaches, see Larkin, Gummy Bears, 
supra note 22, at 356–65. 
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consumers ordinarily smoke,40 ostensibly because hemp contains a low 
concentration of delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the principal psychoactive 
ingredient in marijuana, one that is too low for hemp to have a psychoactive effect.41 
Numerous members, however, have introduced various proposals to modify the 
CSA to make it easier for individuals to possess and distribute marijuana.42  
The open—some might say defiant—clash between federal and state law is 
unhealthy. At the Convention of 1787, the Framers proposed the Constitution 
because they realized that the Articles of Confederation did not create a national 
government that could govern the nation on matters of common interest, as well as 
avoid the interstate and the internecine economic warfare that had led to a 
“Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the 
States.”43 To ensure that the federal government would have the final word on 
matters within its delegated authority, the Article VI Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution preempts a state law that conflicts with federal law.44 The current 
federal and state marijuana regulatory schemes—the former prohibiting the 
distribution of marijuana, whether interstate or intrastate;45 the latter creating 
 
40   See Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2019, § 107, Pub. L. 
No. 116-20, 133 Stat. 871 (2019); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, § 537, 
738, 133 Stat. 13 (2019); Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 10113, 132 
Stat. 4490 (2018); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1072 (2018) (Conf. Rep); Memorandum from Stephen Alexander 
Vaden, Gen’l Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., on Exec. Summary of New Hemp Authorities (May 28, 
2019) and Memorandum from Stephen Alexander Vaden, Gen’l Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., on Re-
garding Legal Opin. on Certain Provisions of the Agric. Improvement Act of 2018 Relating to Hemp 
to Sonny Perdue, Sec’y of Agric., (May 28, 2019). 
41   See MITCH EARLEYWINE, UNDERSTANDING MARIJUANA: A NEW LOOK AT THE SCIENTIFIC EV-
IDENCE 4 (2002). I say “ostensibly” because hemp growers in Kentucky have long urged Congress to 
exempt hemp from Schedule I, and the Senate Majority Leader, Mitch McConnell, is from Kentucky.  
See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 4, at 3, 69; Tom Angell, Here’s Mitch McConnell’s New 
Hemp Legalization Bill, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2018, 12:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/toman-
gell/2018/04/12/heres-mitch-mcconnells-new-hemp-legalization-bill/#16d0acb55b5b 
[https://perma.cc/FHN5-HKJ6]; Susan David Dwyer, The Hemp Controversy: Can Industrial Hemp 
Save Kentucky?, 86 KY. L.J. 1143 (1998). 
42   Consider some of the bills introduced just in the 116th Congress. See, e.g., STATES Act, 
H.R. 2093, 116th Cong. (2019) (matching federal to individual state laws); Cannabidiol and Marijuana 
Research Expansion Act, S. 2032, 116th Cong. (2019) (expanding research on cannabidiol and mari-
huana); Medical Marijuana Research Act of 2019, H.R. 3797, 116th Cong. (2019) (streamlining the 
approval process for applications to conduct marijuana research). 
43   Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). 
44   U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 
320, 324 (2015) (“It is apparent that this Clause states a rule of decision: Courts ‘shall’ regard the 
‘Constitution,’ and all laws ‘made in Pursuance thereof,’ as ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’ They must 
not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 200 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (stating that the Supremacy Clause “declares a truth, which 
flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a Federal Government”). 
45   Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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administrative schemes to regulate intrastate cannabis sales—on their face appear to 
create the type of problem that the Framers sought to avoid through the Supremacy 
Clause: state efforts to nullify a federal regulatory program. 
Although that state-caused discord would seem to violate the Supremacy 
Clause, the issue is more complicated than it first appears. Much of the apparent 
inconsistency is attributable to the oddity of the relatively new state programs. For 
almost sixty years, 1937 to 1996, federal and state laws both prohibited marijuana 
distribution. Now, the criminal codes in states with medical or recreational cannabis 
programs no longer parallel the CSA ban. Yet, it is important to view that divergence 
in context. A difference between state and federal law does not automatically 
translate into a conflict between the two. 
Neither the Constitution nor the CSA requires the states to outlaw cannabis 
distribution. Section 10 of Article I lists a variety of actions that the states cannot 
take, such as enter into a treaty with a foreign government, allow paper money to be 
used to pay debts, and pass an ex post facto law, a bill of attainder, or a law impairing 
the obligation of contracts.46 Neither Section 10 nor any other constitutional 
provision, however, lists actions that a state must take, such as adopt a penal code.47 
What the state legalization acts do, generally speaking, is eliminate the distribution 
and possession of marijuana from criminal liability under the state’s criminal law as 
long as those activities comply with the new state regulatory program. One effect is 
to sideline state and local law enforcement officers from their traditional 
investigative functions, which includes collaborating with their federal counterparts, 
such as Drug Enforcement Administration special agents. Yet, just as Congress 
cannot order the states to treat marijuana distribution as a crime,48 so, too, Congress 
cannot conscript state or local police officers into enforcing federal law.49 If that 
seems odd, remember that there are areas where only federal law criminalizes certain 
conduct.50 The federal ban on marijuana distribution therefore would not be so 
surprising if it operated on a completely stand-alone basis. The dramatic change in 
state marijuana enforcement strategies is what creates the striking anomaly. 
 
46   See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1–3. 
47   Although each of the original thirteen states did. See, e.g., DOUGLAS GREENBERG, CRIME AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK, 1691–1776 (1974); Hugh Rankin, Criminal Trial 
Proceedings in the General Court of Colonial Virginia, 72 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 50 (1964).  
48   See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (ruling that Congress cannot order a state not 
to change state law). 
49   See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (ruling that Congress cannot require state 
law enforcement officers to enforce a federal criminal law). 
50   See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. Ch. 6, 11–12 (2019) (Immigration and Nationalization Agencies, Officers, 
and Stations); 10 U.S.C. Ch. 47 (2019) (Uniform Code of Military Justice); 18 U.S.C. Ch. 118 (2012) 
(War Crimes); 50 U.S.C. Ch. 56 (2018) (Export Administration), repealed and replaced by the John 
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 
1636 (2018). 
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Consider the preemption issue as a matter of technical legal analysis under the 
Supremacy Clause.51 To start, there is no literal conflict between them. The state 
initiatives do not purport to make the distribution of cannabis legal under federal 
law, nor do they compel someone to violate federal law, both of which would 
conflict with the CSA. They also do not penalize someone for complying with 
federal law or reward someone for committing a federal crime, either of which 
would frustrate the latter’s purposes. Moreover, the new state laws are limited 
substantively and jurisdictionally. Substantively, they exempt the sale of marijuana 
only from the per se rules that previously existed under the state’s penal code in 
favor of using a regulatory scheme to govern their distribution and use. 
Jurisdictionally (or geographically), they operate only on an in-state basis; they do 
not purport to allow an in-state business to sell marijuana elsewhere. The state 
legalization measures, therefore, do not expressly or impliedly conflict with the 
CSA. 
To be sure, the state legalization schemes place state law out of sync with 
federal law and, particularly when viewed from an historical perspective, certainly 
seem likely to frustrate Congress’s goal of deterring the sale of marijuana. But the 
states have only exercised authority that they are entirely free to pursue: revising 
their penal codes. Remember that the Supremacy Clause is not a substantive 
command to the states to legislate in any particular fashion, nor is it a restraint on 
their legislative authority, like the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause, to 
make normative judgments or accomplish desired outcomes via the criminal law. 
The Supremacy Clause is just a “rule of decision” that exists to protect Congress’s 
legislative authority.52 If so, the clause cannot require a state to do what Congress 
itself cannot do: order a state to outlaw particular conduct.53 Accordingly, state laws 
establishing medical or recreational cannabis programs do not violate the Supremacy 
Clause. 
Nonetheless, there is more going on in those states than a simple revision or 
repeal of their criminal codes. The states with liberalized marijuana laws have 
elaborate administrative mechanisms to regulate their new medical or recreational 
marijuana programs.54 Take Colorado. State constitutional amendments legalized 
 
51   State law can conflict with federal law in several ways. Congress can enact a statute expressly 
barring any supplemental state regulation. Congress can implicitly preempt state law via a comprehen-
sive regulatory approach that leaves no room for supplemental state regulation. State law can conflict 
with federal law by making it impossible to comply with both federal and state law, or by obstructing 
the purposes of federal law. See, e.g., Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480. 
52   Id. (quoting Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 324). 
53   Supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
54   See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, Div. 10, Ch. 6, Art. 2, §§ 11357-11362.5 (2019); 
COLO. REV. STAT. Tit. 44, arts. I (Medical Marijuana) & II (Colorado Retail Marijuana Code) (West 
2019) (repealed and replaced by 2018 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 55 (H.B. 18-1023)). 
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the medical and recreational use of marijuana in 2000 and 2012, respectively.55 The 
state agency responsible for implementing those medical and recreational marijuana 
programs, including the licensing of distributors and enforcement of state law, is the 
Colorado Marijuana Enforcement Division (CMED), a component of the Colorado 
Department of Revenue.56 That feature of the state programs makes them stand out.  
We have a “rather bizarre system” in place today where “state officials hand out 
licenses to commit federal felonies.”57 Nowhere else do we see established state 
agencies whose entire function is to enable the public to commit acts that violate 
federal criminal law. Even in the area of controlled substances, the state marijuana 
programs are outliers. No state—yet, at least—has legalized the distribution of 
heroin or other Schedule I controlled substances.58 The state programs might not 
technically violate the Supremacy Clause, but they are an extreme oddity generating 
disrespect for the rationality of the law, a rationality that is necessary for the public 
to deem the criminal legitimate and therefore comply with its dictates.59 
Defenders of the state programs argue that Congress should continue to leave 
to the states the issue of whether marijuana should be available for medical and 
recreational use.60 Yet, for the last eighty-plus years—if not the last 110-plus—we 
 
55   See COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 14 (medical marijuana); id. § 16 (recreational marijuana). 
56   See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-11-101 to 44-11-1102 (West 2018) (regulation of 
medical marijuana); id. §§ 44-12-101 to 44-12-1101 (2018) (regulation of retail marijuana sales); 
COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, Marijuana Enforcement, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enf orce-
ment/marijuanaenforcement [https://perma.cc/NZ4A-E59M] (last updated Oct. 7, 2019); COLO. DEP’T 
OF REG. AGENCIES, COLO. OFF. OF POL’Y, RES., AND REG. REFORM, 2018 Sunset Reviews: Colorado 
Medical Marijuana Code & Colorado Retail Marijuana Code (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.sos.state.co.us/CCR/GenerateRulePdf.do?ruleVersionId=8439&file-
Name=1%20CCR%20212-3. 
57   Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health, supra note 23, at 75. 
58   It’s just a matter of time. See, e.g., United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 
2019) (ruling that the so-called federal “Crack House” statute, 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2018), which 
forbids anyone from knowingly operating or managing a permanent or temporary location for the pur-
pose of unlawfully distributing or using a controlled substance, does not bar a city from opening a so-
called “safe injection” site where people can inject heroin or other controlled substances under medical 
supervision); Am. Psychological Ass’n, Symposium: Can Psychedelic Drugs Heal? (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2018/08/psych edelic-drugs-heal; Patricia Mazzei, Denver 
Voters Support ‘Magic’ Mushrooms, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/05/08/us/denver-magic-mushrooms-decriminalization.ht ml [https://perma.cc/HYF7-
XLH9] (noting the Denver voters effectively decriminalized hallucinogenic mushrooms). 
59   See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (concluding that people gener-
ally follow the law because they respect it, not because they fear it); PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF 
LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 9 (1991) (“As criminologists have long known, 
where laws lack legitimacy, violation rates are likely to be relatively high, other factors held constant.”). 
60   One argument is that Congress should leave that decision to the states as part of their author-
ity to regulate medical practice. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121–24 (1889) (upholding 
the state’s authority to regulate the practice of medicine); Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federal-
ism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 849 (2017) (noting the consensus that “state jurisdiction is reserved for medical 
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have entrusted the FDA with that responsibility. Since Congress enacted the Pure 
Food and Drug Act of 1906 (PFDA), no one has challenged the basic principle that 
medical and scientific problems need and deserve a medical or scientific answer. 
Since Congress replaced that act with the FDCA in 1938, no one has challenged the 
consensus that the FDA should have the responsibility to make those medical and 
scientific judgments. The decisions that Congress made in 1906 and 1938 to vest 
decision-making responsibility in experts in the federal government is now a settled 
feature of American law and public policy. No one seriously argues that we should 
reconsider that judgment, and no one in Congress is likely to do so. 
There is no reason to exempt botanical marijuana from that rule. No other drug 
is subject to approval by plebiscite because, though it is impolitic to say, we do not 
want to trust public health decisions to an electorate that generally lacks even a 
college degree, let alone an advanced one in medicine, biochemistry, or 
pharmacology.61 Whatever your view of the relevance and merit of an administrative 
agency’s view of the law,62 no one seriously maintains that we should empower 
individuals lacking the necessary scientific education, training, and expertise to 
make dispositive judgments on questions of medical or scientific fact. In sum, we 
should continue to leave to the FDA the responsibility to decide whether the 
marijuana plant (or any of its components) is a safe, effective, and pure drug.63 
 
practice—the activities of physicians and other health care professionals—while federal jurisdiction 
covers “medical products, including drugs”) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). The Supreme 
Court once said that Congress lacked the authority to regulate medical practice. See Linder v. United 
States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (“[D]irect control of medical practice in the states is beyond the power of 
the federal government.”). Whether or not the Supreme Court would reaffirm that position today, the 
Court has upheld Congress’s authority to ban inter- or intrastate distribution of drugs, including mari-
juana. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
61   See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Folly of Requiring Complete Knowledge of the Criminal Law, 12 
LIBERTY U. L. REV. 335, 344 (2018) (according to 2015 data from the U.S. Census Bureau, nearly 90% 
of adults had a high school diploma or a graduate equivalency degree, roughly 59% had completed at 
least some amount of college, only 42% received an associate’s degree, only 33% received a bachelor’s 
degree, and only 12% received an advanced degree). 
62   Compare Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2410, 2413 (2019) (lead opinion of Kagan, J.), 
with id. at 24–25 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part), and with id. at 2442–43 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.); 
see Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Baseball, Legal Doctrines, and Judicial Deference to an Agency’s Interpretation 
of the Law: Kisor v. Wilkie, 2018-2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 69 (2019). 
63   See, e.g., BRIAN F. THOMAS & MAHMOUD A. ELSOHLY, THE ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY OF 
CANNABIS xiv (2016) (arguing that the FDA needs to be closely involved in marijuana regulation than 
the Drug Enforcement Administration); Sean M. O’Connor & Erika Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of 
FDA Regulation of Cannabis, Even After Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (2019) (explaining that 
descheduling cannabis transfers regulatory authority to the FDA). Besides, a “states’ rights” approach 
makes little sense as a matter of economics. As long as there is a demand for marijuana (a very safe 
assumption), smugglers will find a way to transport it from states where it is available and cheap to 
states where it is not. Consider cigarettes. States like Virginia and North Carolina lightly tax cigarettes; 
New York State and City tax them heavily. The result is that more than half of the cigarettes sold by 
convenience stores in New York City are contraband, having been purchased and trucked from the 
former states north. The same would be true with respect to marijuana, which is why a national solution 
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Regardless of their effect on federal domestic policy, state liberalization 
measures pose a risk of interfering in the nation’s foreign policy. The international 
community created several international agreements designed jointly to combat 
trafficking in dangerous drugs, such as heroin and marijuana, by criminalizing their 
distribution within the jurisdiction of each participating country. The United States 
is a signatory to three such agreements.64 Article I of the Constitution vests in the 
federal government the exclusive authority to enter into international agreements,65 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to implement those 
treaties via domestic laws such as the CSA.66 Foreign nations could decide (honestly 
or otherwise) that the federal government’s unwillingness to enforce federal law in 
the face of the post-1996 state liberalization efforts indicates that the United States 
has abandoned its international obligations without paying the other signatories the 
respect of forthrightly withdrawing from those agreements. That risk provides an 
additional justification for Congress’s action.67 
 
* * * * * 
 
Where does that leave us? With these two points.  
First, it is irrelevant whether the state liberalization measures would survive a 
challenge in federal court under the Supremacy Clause. They create substantial 
uncertainty in the law, they generate considerable disrespect for its authority, and 
they encourage millions of dollars in investment and state taxes that could be undone 
 
is desirable. Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health, supra note 23, at 75–76. Any “states’ rights” 
claim is more slogan than argument. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., States’ Rights and Federal Wrongs: The 
Misguided Attempt to Label Marijuana Legalization Efforts as a “States’ Rights” Issue, 16 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 495 (2018) [hereinafter Larkin, States’ Rights]. 
64   Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, amended by 1972 
Protocol, Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 
U.S.T. 543; United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164. Marijuana is a covered substance. See INT’L NARCOTICS 
CONTROL BD., UNITED NATIONS, LIST OF PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
5 (28th ed. 2017). 
65   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confedera-
tion[.]”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur[.]”). 
66   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department of Officer 
thereof.”). 
67   The question, of course, is not whether the growth of those state programs would prove in 
court that the United States has abandoned its treaty obligations. Other nations could decide, for their 
own domestic or international purposes, that the United States has walked away from those agreements, 
or that they should use the state programs as an excuse to withdraw from different international obli-
gations by saying that sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. 
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by strict federal enforcement. That scenario demands a federal response. It is no 
longer possible to ignore the state-law developments and retain credibility about the 
public welfare. The questions for Congress are similar to the ones that every first-
year law student learns in torts class. What are the potential harms and benefits of 
permitting recreational marijuana use? What is the likelihood and extent of each? 
What preventative measures can avoid the harms while not interfering with the 
benefits? What is the cost of those safeguards? What is the likelihood of error of 
making each of those judgments? Can a mistaken judgment be remedied at a 
reasonable cost? The federal government must answer those questions. 
Second, so far neither Congress nor the president has displayed any interest in 
accepting that responsibility. Marijuana is a “hot button” issue—viz., a dispute that 
will cause elected officials to lose votes regardless of which side they support. That 
is why our elected federal officials have generally sat on the sidelines for the last 
two decades. Yes, they have taken some limited actions. With respect to the medical 
use of marijuana, Congress has handcuffed the Justice Department through 
appropriations riders that seek to bar the department from challenging state medical 
marijuana programs. With respect to the recreational use of marijuana, Congress is 
considering legislation that nibbles around the edges of the issue, like the 2018 hemp 
law. With respect to the medical or recreational use of marijuana, the last four 
administrations have declined to interfere through FDA civil enforcement actions 
with the increasing prevalence of new state medical and recreational cannabis 
initiatives, or even to urge Congress to resolve this problem. Every elected federal 
official knows the trend in state marijuana laws and is waiting—some hoping, others 
praying—for a fait accompli to occur before taking a stand on the issues. Yet, 
entreating the Almighty for deliverance from a difficult decision68 is not a 
responsible plan. No one should seriously believe that elected federal officials could 
reasonably ask this cup to pass forever or should want Congress and the president to 
adopt a Sergeant Schultz-like posture toward the state-law developments.69 It is time 
for our elected officials to earn their pay. 
 
II. MEDICAL-USE MARIJUANA 
 
Throughout history, amateur apothecaries created primitive nostrums from 
available plants to cure disease or alleviate misery. Marijuana was one such plant.70 
Relying on that history (or a preference for natural herbal medicines), critics of the 
CSA’s marijuana regulatory regimen argue that Congress went wrong when it 
concluded that there is no legitimate medical use for the plant form of cannabis. By 
 
68   Matthew 26:39 (King James) (“O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me[.]”). 
69   Hogan’s Heroes (CBS 1965-71) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OsXrpxo4uC0 (the all-
seeing, all-hearing, all-knowing Sergeant Hans Schultz).  
70   Sunil K. Aggarwal et al., Medicinal Use of Cannabis in the United States: Historical Per-
spectives, Current Trends, and Future Directions, 5 J. OPIOID MGMT. 153, 153–57 (2009). 
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contrast, defenders of prohibition or regulation of marijuana, pointing to our recent, 
fifty-year effort to quell cigarette smoking,71 maintain that botanical marijuana is not 
a legitimate delivery system for whatever medicinal benefits cannabis might 
provide. The debate has persisted for decades in legislatures, academic journals, and 
public discussion without either side winning a clear victory.72 
Now, it is not surprising for members of Congress or drug policy experts to 
disagree over that issue. The former respond to separate, discrete electorates with 
different views; the latter are members of those electorates. Yet, even physicians can 
take opposite sides on what, at first blush, appears to be largely a scientific issue. 
Some firmly believe that, contrary to the CSA’s Schedule I designation, agricultural 
cannabis has legitimate medical uses as a treatment for various maladies and their 
symptoms.73 Others just as strongly disagree.74 
 
71   See, e.g., DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A 
DEADLY INDUSTRY (2002). 
72   See, e.g., MEDICAL MARIJUANA (Margaret Haerens & Lynn N. Zott eds., 2013) (summarizing 
the pro and con arguments for treating cannabis as a medicine); Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 
28, at 461–63 & nn.30–36 (same); see generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Deborah E. Leiderman, Can-
nabis for Medical Use: FDA and DEA Regulation in the Hall of Mirrors, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 246 
(2019); Lewis A. Grossman, Life, Liberty, [and the Pursuit of Happiness]: Medical Marijuana Regu-
lation in Historical Context, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 280 (2019). 
73   See, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. REPORT, supra note 25, at 53–54 (listing conditions for which mari-
juana is a treatment for which there are varying degrees of scientific support, such as nausea, appetite 
loss, pain, and anxiety); DAVID CASARETT, STONED: A DOCTOR’S CASE FOR MEDICAL MARIJUANA 
(2015); PATRICIA C. FRYE & DAVID SMITHERMAN, THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA GUIDE: CANNABIS AND 
YOUR HEALTH (2018); BONNI GOLDSTEIN, CANNABIS REVEALED: HOW THE WORLD'S MOST MISUNDER-
STOOD PLANT IS HEALING EVERYTHING FROM CHRONIC PAIN TO EPILEPSY (2016); LESTER GRINSPOON 
& JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE (1997); MICHAEL H. MOSKOWITZ, 
MEDICAL CANNABIS: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS, PRACTITIONERS, AND CAREGIVERS (2017); J. Michael 
Bostwick, Clinical Decisions: Medicinal Use of Marijuana—Recommend the Medical Use of Mariju-
ana, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 866 (2013); Jerome P. Kassirer, Federal Foolishness and Marijuana, 336 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 366 (1997).  Some physicians recommend inhalation (e.g., smoking or vaporizing). 
See DAVID BEARMAN & MARIA PETTINATO, CANNABIS MEDICINE: A GUIDE TO THE PRACTICE OF CAN-
NABINOID MEDICINE 46, 48 (2018). Others are unclear whether people should smoke cannabis. 
74   See, e.g., ROBERT L. DUPONT, THE SELFISH BRAIN: LEARNING FROM ADDICTION 147–54 
(2019 ed. 1997); GOGEK, supra note 1; KEVIN P. HILL, MARIJUANA: THE UNBIASED TRUTH ABOUT THE 
WORLD’S MOST POPULAR WEED (2015); Gary M. Reisfield & Robert L. DuPont, Clinical Decisions: 
Medicinal Use of Marijuana—Recommend against the Medical Use of Marijuana, 368 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 866, 868 (2013); see also BERTHA K. MADRAS, UPDATE OF CANNABIS AND ITS MEDICAL USE 
(2015), http://www.who.int/medicines/access/controlled-substances/6_2_cannabis_update.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SA4P-SRA6] (commissioned monograph to 37th Expert Committee on Drug De-
pendence, World Health Organization). Some experts and commentators believe that we do not yet 
know the likely long-term harms from cannabis use and that the state laws creating medical marijuana 
schemes have greatly outdistanced the science necessary to justify a medical version of “the Great Leap 
Forward.” See, e.g., Archie Bleyer & Brian Barnes, Opioid Death Rate Acceleration in Jurisdictions 
Legalizing Marijuana Use, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1280, 1280 (2018); Wilson M. Compton et al., 
Medical Marijuana Laws and Cannabis Use: Intersections of Health and Policy, 74 JAMA PSYCHIA-
TRY 559, 559 (2017); Wayne Hall et al., Public Health Implications of Legalising the Production and 
Sale of Cannabis for Medicinal and Recreational Use, 394 LANCET 1580 (2019); Janni Leung et al., 
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I am not a physician, a biochemist, or a botanist, but I am familiar with the 
longstanding approach that American law has used to regulate the safety and 
effectiveness of food, food additives, and drugs, as well as the consensus belief that 
this approach best protects the public without trammeling the legitimate interests of 
any particular individual or group. Marijuana falls under the FDA’s jurisdiction as 
a drug or a food additive.75 Given that legal framework, I believe that it is a mistake 
to claim that smoking or eating botanical marijuana is a legitimate treatment.76 
 
What Have Been the Public Health Impacts of Cannabis Legalisation in the USA? A Review of Evi-
dence on Adverse and Beneficial Effects, CURR. ADDICTION REP. 418 (2019). 
75   See, e.g., Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 345–48, 373–78 (concluding that the FDA 
has authority to regulate cannabis edibles as a food additive); O’Connor & Lietzan, supra note 63, at 
851–96 (concluding that the FDA has authority to regulate cannabis edibles as a food additive or a 
drug); Zettler, supra note 60, at 878–79 (concluding that the FDA has authority to regulate cannabis as 
a drug). The FDA agrees. See, e.g., “Cannabis Policies for a New Decade:” Hearing on Before the 
House Commerce Comm. Subcomm. on Health, 116th Cong. 1-4 (2020) [hereinafter House Cannabis 
Hearing] (statement of Douglas C. Throckmorton, Dep. Dir. For Reg’y Programs, U.S. Food & Drug 
Adm’n), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/20200115/ 110381/HHRG-116-IF14-Wstate-
ThrockmortonD-20200115.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2PF-X36D]; Statement from FDA Commissioner 
Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on signing of the Agriculture Improvement Act and the agency’s regulation of 
products containing cannabis and cannabis-derived compounds (Dec. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Gottlieb 
Statement], https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-
scott-gottlieb-md-signing-agriculture-improvement-act-and-agencys [https://perma.cc/RP9Y-CBDP]; 
Warning Letters and Test Results for Cannabidiol-Related Products: 2015-2019 (Nov. 26, 2019; last 
accessed Jan. 14, 2020) https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/warning-letters-and-
test-results-cannabidiol-related-products [https://perma.cc/55EV-KMLC] (warning letters issued to 
companies selling unapproved new drugs containing cannabidiol, a non-psychoactive substance in ma-
rijuana that the FDA has not approved for use in any drug for any purpose); Larkin, Gummy Bears, 
supra note 22, at 374–77 & nn.137–46 (same). 
76   It is critical to distinguish the plant form of cannabis from pharmaceutically processed can-
nabinoids. Some cannabinoids have therapeutic value. The FDA has approved the synthetic delta-9-
THC analogues dronabinol (Marinol) and nabilone (Cesamet) for treatment of chemotherapy-induced 
nausea and emesis, as well as appetite stimulation in cachexic patients suffering from cancer or 
HIV/AIDS wasting syndrome. The FDA has also approved Epidiolex, a purified form of CBD, for use 
in the treatment of Dravet’s Syndrome and Lennox-Gastaut Syndrome, two severely debilitating forms 
of childhood-onset epilepsy. U.S. Food & Drug Adm’n, FDA Regulation of Cannabis and Cannabis-
Derived Products, Including Cannabidiol (CBD), Questions and Answers 3 & 4 (Dec. 6, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/fda-regulation-cannabis-and-cannabis-derived-
products-including-cannabidiol-cbd#approved [https://perma.cc/SB3X-9V2U]. Further research is 
needed to learn whether other cannabinoids also have therapeutic benefits and can pass FDA scrutiny. 
BEARMAN & PETTINATO, supra note 73, at 26–39, 49, 64–78; THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at 
111–14; Richard A. Grucza & Andrew D. Plunk, Where Is Cannabis Legalization Leading?, 77 JAMA 
PSYCHIATRY 119, 120 (2020) (“[R]esearch on recreational cannabis legalization is in its infancy.”); 
Throckmorton, House Cannabis Hearing, supra note 75, at 9–10; compare, e.g., Chao Liu et al., Can-
nabinoids Promote Progression of HPV Positive Head and Neck Squamous Cell Carcinoma via p38 
MAPK Activation, CLINICAL CANCER RESEARCH (Jan. 13, 2020), https://clincancerres.aacrjour-
nals.org/content/early/2020/01/11/1078-0432.CCR-18-3301 (finding that THC in the bloodstream ac-
tivates a mechanism preventing aptosis of cancer cells), with, e.g., Donald I. Abrams & Manuel Guz-
man, Can Cannabis Cure Cancer?, JAMA ONCOLOGY (Jan. 16, 2020), 
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Indeed, the claim that either activity can cure various diseases falls along the 
spectrum somewhere between risible and fraudulent.77 
For more than eight decades,78 the nation has accepted the proposition that the 
federal government, rather than the states, should regulate the nationwide 
distribution of drugs used for the treatment of disease and injuries to prevent the 
public against harm from adulterated, misbranded, or ineffective drugs.79 Congress 
has vested that responsibility in the FDA, and it has extensively regulated the 
manufacture and marketing of pharmaceuticals. Any company seeking to market a 
“new drug”80 must prove (inter alia) that the drug is safe, effective, and pure for its 
intended use,81 that the company uses “current good manufacturing practice” to 
 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaoncology/fullarticle/2758576 [https://perma.cc/3CL C-NFP7] 
(suggesting that cannabinoids, including THC, might have anti-tumor effects). 
77   See, e.g., GOGEK, supra note 1, at 111–12 (“Political campaigns sell marijuana laws to the 
voting public with ads that feature cancer patients using marijuana for nausea. But it’s a bait and 
switch . . . . The patients using medical marijuana in real life are disproportionately young and male, 
and few of them have serious illnesses . . . . Dates from 2012 show that in Arizona, 90 percent of the 
marijuana patients claimed pain while only 4 percent got the drug for cancer. In Colorado, 94 percent 
claimed pain; 3 percent claimed cancer. In Oregon, 94 percent also claimed pain. [¶]A 2014 study that 
used data from seven states found that 91 percent of all the medical marijuana patients got their mari-
juana for pain while only 3 percent reported cancer. AIDS, glaucoma, Alzheimer’s, Hepatitis C and 
ALS accounted for another 2 percent.”) (footnote omitted); Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra note 
23, at 30 (“Unfortunately, there is very little in the way of intellectually honest marijuana-policy anal-
ysis.”); id. at 21 (“In the 1990s, several states introduced ‘medical marijuana’ programs. Though ma-
rijuana use was made legal only for medical purposes, the regulations were often so loose that essen-
tially anyone could get a physician’s ‘recommendation,’ authorizing that person to purchase marijuana. 
Suppliers were euphemistically called ‘caregivers’ (even though some never met the ‘patients’ they 
were caring for), and they sold out of brick-and-mortar retail stores known as ‘dispensaries.’ At one 
point, there were thousands of dispensaries in California alone.”); Kleiman, Marijuana and Public 
Health, supra note 23, at 73 (describing the medical marijuana reform campaign as being “largely 
fraudulent,” but “worked like a charm”); Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 374–77 & nn.137–
46 (discussing FDA’s issuance of warning letters to companies that had marketed dietary supplements 
containing cannabidiol for treatment of cancer, Alzheimer’s and other diseases). 
78   More than eleven, if you start counting from the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. 
79   See Larkin, States’ Rights, supra note 63, at 496–97, 499–500 (“We do not . . . make scien-
tific decisions in the same manner that we elect politicians: by ballot.”). 
80   A “new drug” includes “[a]ny drug . . . [that] is not generally recognized, among experts 
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe 
and effective for use under the conditions prescribed . . . . ” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2016); 21 C.F.R. § 
310.3(h) (2018). Despite its age, cannabis would constitute a “new drug” under the FDCA and FDA’s 
rules. See Gottlieb Statement, supra note 75 (“Cannabis or cannabis-derived products claiming in their 
marketing and promotional materials that they’re intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of diseases (such as cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, psychiatric disorders and 
diabetes) are considered new drugs or new animal drugs and must go through the FDA drug approval 
process for human or animal use before they are marketed in the U.S.”); O’Connor & Lietzan, supra 
note 63, at 861–86. 
81   Proof of safety and effectiveness requires extensive clinical testing, which generally has three 
phases. Phase I encompass initial clinical testing in human and is primarily designed to assess safety, 
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assure the drug’s quality, that the label’s information regarding (for example) the 
quantity of the drug’s active ingredients and excipients (inactive ingredients) is 
accurate, and that the directions for use are helpful to a consumer.82 That information 
enables a physician to decide whether a drug should benefit a patient.83 
Raw, agricultural cannabis cannot satisfy those requirements.84 Start with the 
fact that commercially manufactured prescription and over-the-counter medicines 
contain “pure and stable” chemicals, which enables the FDA and physicians to know 
“precisely what their patients are taking.”85 Botanicals like marijuana do not. Unlike 
ordinary pharmaceuticals, marijuana is not a “standardized good”—that is, the plant 
is not a single chemical compound or a product with precise and uniform ingredients, 
formulations, and potency.86 On the contrary, the marijuana plant is “a chemically 
complex and highly variable” product87—or, put more colorfully, “a complex 
chemical slush”88—containing hundreds of different chemicals.89 The chemical 
composition of a cannabis plant can vary along a host of parameters, such as strain, 
breeding, region, conditions and process of cultivation, harvesting stage, processing 
method, storage time, and the like.90 Moreover, due to selective breeding, marijuana 
 
tolerability, pharmacodynamics (viz., the effect of a drug on the body), pharmacokinetics (viz., the 
movement of a drug through a body), and (only preliminarily) potential therapeutic benefits. Phase II 
testing is designed to explore, and Phase III to confirm or refute, the therapeutic effects of a drug on a 
particular disease or condition. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2018). Proof of purity, which ensures that every 
dose is the same, results from manufacturing controls. See id. § 314.50. 
82   See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(a)(2)(B), 352, 352(b), (c)-(f), 355(a), (b) & (d) (2018); 21 C.F.R. 
Pt. 200 Subpt. A (2018) (General Labeling Provisions); id. Pt. 201 (Labeling); id. Pt. 211 (Current 
Good Manufacturing Practices for Finished Pharmaceuticals); FDA, COMPLIANCE PROGRAM GUIDANCE 
MANUAL § 7346.832 (2010); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566–68 (2009); Zettler, supra note 60, at 
857–59. 
83   See THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at 11 (“The quality, safety, and efficacy of starting 
material are basic prerequisites in the pharmaceutical industry.”). 
84   See, e.g., CASARETT, supra note 73, at 238 (noting that science needs to know exactly what 
is in an experiment and “that’s pretty much impossible if what you’re putting into an experiment is 
simply the contents of what you harvested from your garden, dried, and pulverized.”). 
85   DUPONT, supra note 74, at 148; see also, e.g., NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA 34–
35 (Sept. 2019) [hereafter NIDA, MARIJUANA], https://www.drugabuse.gov/node/pdf/ 1380/marijuana 
(“Botanicals may contain hundreds of unknown, active chemicals, and it can be difficult to develop a 
product with accurate and consistent doses of these chemicals.”). 
86   JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO 
KNOW 34 (2d ed. 2016). 
87   THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at 11. 
88   DUPONT, supra note 74, at 142. 
89   Cannabis includes 545 “cannabinoids” (viz., biologically active ingredients) and other com-
pounds. See, e.g., THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at xiii–xiv, 5 Tbl. 1.3, 11, 27–37. 
90   See, e.g., THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at xiii–xiv (“The number of parameters on 
which cannabis products can vary is enormous, from strain, growing conditions, harvesting methods, 
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comes in “hundreds of strains” with different chemical compositions.91 The lack of 
certainty and uniformity in the chemical makeup of different varieties of cannabis is 
a critical shortcoming under the standards demanded by contemporary medicine and 
law because neither the FDA nor a treating physician could know precisely what 
substances a patient would use. 
The uncertain chemical content of the cannabis plant is not the only problem. 
The psychoactive component of marijuana—delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol or 
THC—has increased remarkably over time as growers have sought to enhance their 
profits by creating a better, more attractive, psychotropic product. From the 1960s 
through the 1980s, marijuana had a THC content of approximately 3-4 percent. 
Today, the THC content can be 12-20 percent in the plant form or in hashish (dried 
cannabis resin and crushed plants). Hash oil, an oil-based extract of hashish, has a 
greater THC content in the range of 15-65 percent, while other formulations, such 
as oil extracts, can be in the 90-plus percent range for THC.92 Moreover, the 
psychoactive effect of THC varies according to an individual’s “set” (viz., user 
expectation) and the “setting” (viz., environment) in which use occurs.93 Given their 
variance from person to person and occasion to occasion, a physician could not be 
confident when predicting the effect of THC use on an individual patient. The result 
is that neither the FDA nor a recommending physician would know the potency of 
the cannabis that a patient would use, so neither one could accurately approve or 
recommend its use, respectively. 
THC is not the only cannabinoid; another common one is cannabidiol or CBD. 
We do not yet know all of the potential psychodynamic properties of CBD, but what 
we know is promising.94 CBD has no known toxicities, and there is no evidence that 
it is euphoric, intoxicating, cognition impairing, addictive, or psychosis 
 
and handling to storage and processing of the raw material to combination with a wide variety of foods 
and other excipients in manufacturing to methods of administration (eating, smoking, ‘vaping,’ apply-
ing to mucous membranes). At every step, from planting through consumption, myriad influences can 
alter dose, absorption rate, interactions among constituents, exposure to toxins, and a host of other 
factors that can result in underdosing, overdosing, and various types and levels of acute and chronic 
poisoning, not excepting an increase in the probability of lung cancer.”), 11, 30 (“[T]he cannabinoid 
content and profile changes over time as the plant grows, matures, and ages.”), 34, 63–64, 84. 
91   THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at 30; see also, e.g., FRYE & SMITHERMAN, supra note 
73, at 9 (“As we now know, the cannabinoid production varies from plant to plant, and ten drops of 
one batch might be therapeutic, but ten drops of the next batch might have a much higher content of 
THC and sicken the patient.”), 43. 
92   See, e.g., Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 344–49. 
93   See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 56–57; JERROLD S. MEYER & LINDA F. QUENZER, PSY-
CHOPHARMACOLOGY: DRUGS, THE BRAIN, AND BEHAVIOR 414 (2d ed. 2018). 
94   See, e.g., Douglas L. Boggs et al., Clinical and Preclinical Evidence for Functional Interac-
tions of Cannabidiol and D(9)-Tetrahydrocannabinol, 43 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 142 (2018); 
Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Bertha K. Madras, Opioids, Overdoses, and Cannabis: Is Marijuana an Effective 
Therapeutic Response to the Opioid Abuse Epidemic?, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 573–76 (2019). 
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precipitating.95 Interestingly, CBD might offset potential adverse results from THC 
use, such as anxiety, cognitive impairment, amotivational syndrome, addiction, and 
psychosis.96 The reason is that CBD and THC might have possibly antagonistic 
pharmacological effects.97 Yet, while the THC level in street marijuana has risen 
dramatically over the last twenty years, the CBD level has correspondingly declined, 
from a THC:CBD ratio of 2:1 to a ratio of 80:1 or higher, as growers seek to cultivate 
a product with a more powerful “rush.”98 The unknown but variant ratio in smokable 
marijuana would, yet again, make it difficult for the FDA or a recommending 
physician to make an accurate judgment regarding the effect of commercial 
marijuana on a large number of people or one particular patient.99 
Standardizing the THC content and THC:CBD ratio in smokable marijuana still 
would not solve the problem. THC exists in assorted formulations for different 
methods of use: inhalation, ingestion, sublingual, intranasal, transdermal, and 
rectal.100 That difference matters because THC reaches the brain far more quickly 
 
95   See Shanna Babalonis et al., Oral Cannabidiol Does Not Produce a Signal for Abuse Liability 
in Frequent Marijuana Smokers, 172 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 9 (2017); Margaret Haney et al., 
Oral Cannabidiol Does Not Alter the Subjective, Reinforcing or Cardiovascular Effects of Smoked 
Cannabis, 41 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1974 (2016); Alex F. Manini et al., Safety and Pharma-
cokinetics of Oral Cannabidiol When Administered Concomitantly with Intravenous Fentanyl in Hu-
mans, 9 J. ADDICTION MED. 204 (2015); Philip McGuire et al., Cannabidiol (CBD) as an Adjunctive 
Therapy in Schizophrenia: A Multicenter Randomized Controlled Trial, 175 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 225 
(2018); Kerstin Iffland & Franjo Grotenhermen, An Update on Safety and Side Effects of Cannabidiol: 
A Review of Clinical Data and Relevant Animal Studies, 2 CANNABIS & CANNABINOID RES. 139 (2017). 
96   Larkin & Madras, supra note 94, at 576 (“[W]e cannot yet say that CBD will reduce or elim-
inate all adverse effects of THC, but preliminary data indicate that CBD does attenuate specific THC-
elicited neuroadaptations.”) (footnote omitted); Bertha K. Madras et al., Dramatic Increase of Dopa-
mine D1–D2 Receptor Heteromers by Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in Primate Caudate Nucleus Is 
Attenuated by Cannabidiol (CBD), NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (2016), https://acnp.org/videos/ber-
tha-madras/ [https://perma.cc/RL84-AGVB]; Christian D. Schubart et al., Cannabis with High Canna-
bidiol Content Is Associated with Fewer Psychotic Experiences, 130 SCHIZOPHRENIA RESEARCH 216 
(2011). 
97   See Amir Englund et al., Can We Make Cannabis Safer?, 4 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 643 (2017).  
98   See Mahmoud A. ElSohly et al., Changes in Cannabis Potency over the Last Two Decades 
(1995–2014): Analysis of Current Data in the United States, 79 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 613 (2016). 
99   See, e.g., Statement of Nora Volkow, Dir., Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse 7 (Jan. 15, 2020), in 
House Cannabis Hearing, supra note 75 (“[I]n general, adequate and well-controlled studies are lack-
ing, which means that individuals across the country are using cannabis strains and extracts that have 
not undergone the rigorous clinical trials required to show that they are safe and effective for medical 
use, and are not regulated for consistency or quality.”); CASARETT, supra note 73, at 116 (“Not know-
ing—by a factor of ten[—]how much of a drug you’re going to get makes it almost impossible to find 
the right dose for the right patient.”); MOSKOWITZ, supra note 73, at 10 (noting that “most testing is up 
to the vendors,” and “studies have shown them to be quite inaccurate,” perhaps due to “poor testing, 
reliance on old testing, the ever-changing nature of harvested cannabis, and/or outright deception”). 
100  See, e.g., THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at 50. 
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when a user inhales it rather than ingests or absorbs it.101 That is why many users 
prefer to smoke marijuana than consume it in pill form. Moreover, many users titrate 
the amount that they inhale to achieve their desired state of euphoria. Accordingly, 
there is no standard number of occasions when someone will smoke marijuana, no 
standard number of total inhalations, and no standard depth or length of any one 
inhalation.102 That likely explains why the FDA has never approved any drug in a 
 
101  See, e.g., JOHN BRICK & CARLTON E. ERICKSON, DRUGS, THE BRAIN, AND BEHAVIOR: THE 
PHARMACOLOGY OF DRUG USE DISORDERS 106 (2d ed. 2013); LESLIE L. IVERSEN, THE SCIENCE OF MA-
RIJUANA 41–47 (2d ed. 2008). Different THC delivery system can also create different problems. For 
example, the delay in the onset of the sought-after euphoria from consuming edibles can lead people 
to consume a quantity that precipitates hallucinations. Moreover, marijuana edibles, particularly ones 
resembling commercially available food products, pose a serious risk of inadvertent consumption by 
children. See, e.g., Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 320–22 & nn. 23–24, 324–39 & nn. 30–
63, 382–83 (Appendix); Kathy T. Vo et al., Cannabis Intoxication Case Series: The Dangers of Edibles 
Containing Tetrahydrocannabinol, 71 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 306 (2018). Moreover, consider 
“vaping.” On the one hand, THC vaporizes at a lower temperature than it takes to burn marijuana, so 
you could get the benefits without inhaling burnt carbon products. CASARETT, supra note 73, at 109–
10. On the other hand, marijuana vaping is a growing problem, particularly among adolescents, who 
resort to vaping rather than smoking marijuana to avoid its telltale aroma. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. ON 
DRUG ABUSE, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, VAPING OF MARIJUANA ON THE RISE AMONG TEENS (Dec. 18, 
2019) (“Past year vaping of marijuana, which has more than doubled in the past two years, was reported 
at 20.8% among 12th graders, with 10th graders not far behind at 19.4% and eighth graders at 7.0%. 
Past month marijuana vaping among 12th graders nearly doubled in a single year to 14% from 7.5%—
the second largest one-year jump ever tracked for any substance in the history of the survey.”); Lucas 
Drill & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Vaping, Marijuana, and Government Regulation, inFOCUS 14, 15 (Winter 
2020), https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2020/01/06/vaping-marijuana-and-government-regula-
tion/; R. Miech et al., Vaping Trends among Adolescents, 2017-2019, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1490 
(2019); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN’L, E-CIGARETTE 
USE AMONG YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 6, 14, 57–58, 203, 241 
(2016). The problem appears to be the combination of THC and vitamin E acetate, an additive to e-
cigarette liquids. Vitamin e acetate is viscous but harmless when applied to the skin, but can prove 
deadly when inhaled, because it becomes viscous again after inhalation. See, e.g., B.C. Blount, Vitamin 
E Acetate in Bronchoalveolar-Lavage Fluid Associated with EVALI, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa19164 33?articleTools=true; Yasmeen M. Butt et al., 
Pathology of Vaping-Associated Lung Injury, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1780 (2019); David C. Christiana, 
Vaping-Induced Lung Injury, NEW ENGLAND J. MED., Sept. 6, 2019, https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1 
056/NEJMe1912032?articleTools=true; Drill & Larkin, supra, at 15–16; Jennifer E. Layden et al., Pul-
monary Illness Related to E-Cigarette Use in Illinois and Wisconsin—Final Report, NEW ENG. J. MED., 
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa1911614?query=recirc_curat-
edRelated_article. The federal government has found that numerous people who have suffered adverse 
pulmonary effects from vaping have used marijuana or cannabis oils. See Drill & Larkin, supra, at 15–
16; Volkow, supra note 99, at 5, in House Cannabis Hearing, supra note 75. The FDA has recently 
acted against certain vaping products, in part to avoid their contribution to adolescent use. See, e.g., 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, OUTBREAK OF LUNG INJURY ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
USE OF E-CIGARETTE, OR VAPING, PRODUCTS (Jan. 9, 2020); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADM’N, ENFORCEMENT 
PRIORITIES FOR ELECTRONIC NICOTINE DELIVERY SYSTEM (ENDS) AND OTHER DEEMED PRODUCTS ON 
THE MARKET WITHOUT PREMARKET AUTHORIZATION (Jan. 2020); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADM’N, LUNG 
ILLNESSES ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF VAPING PRODUCTS (Dec. 26, 2019). 
102  See THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at 53 (noting a two to fifty-six percent variation in 
the THC concentration in blood plasma of different persons due to differences in “smoking dynamics”). 
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smokable form. As University of Pennsylvania Medical School Professor David 
Casarett succinctly put it, “A joint is hardly a medicine.”103 Accordingly, neither the 
FDA nor a physician can know precisely how much THC and CBD someone would 
receive by smoking marijuana.104 
Atop all that is another problem. Commercially sold marijuana can contain a 
“hodgepodge” of dangerous contaminants.105 Among them are microbials (e.g., E. 
coli, fungi, mold), toxins (e.g., aflatoxins), hazardous chemical solvents remaining 
from the extraction process (e.g., butane, hexane, propane), pesticides (e.g., 
organophosphates), heavy metals (e.g., arsenic, cadmium, lead, mercury), and other 
harmful (e.g., formaldehyde) or distasteful (e.g., insects) substances.106 
All those reasons explain why the FDA has never approved, and could never 
approve, the crude, plant form of marijuana as a therapeutically useful drug107 and 
no reputable pharmaceutical company would distribute any such product.108 In fact, 
the presence of toxic substances would render a drug adulterated and subject to 
 
103  CASARETT, supra note 73, at 249. 
104  See, e.g., id. (“That variability [in the presence and amount of cannabinoids in marijuana], it 
seems to me, makes it very difficult to call marijuana a ‘medicine’ in the same way that, say, penicillin 
is a medicine. For these reasons, I still think of marijuana as more of less equivalent to an herbal rem-
edy. It’s essentially plant-based stuff with numerous active and inactive ingredients, only some of 
which we understand. And those ingredients make an appearance in varying does and ratios among 
plants and between crops.”). 
105  DUPONT, supra note 74, at 148. 
106  See, e.g., CASARETT, supra note 73, at 186–88; FRYE & SMITHERMAN, supra note 73, at 51–
53, 55; THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at 30, 44–46; Jenna Hardesty Bishop, Weeding the Garden 
of Pesticide Regulation: When the Marijuana Industry Goes Unchecked, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 223, 226 
(2016) (“Test samples of marijuana overwhelmingly reveal that growers are choosing to use unap-
proved and unregulated pesticides, creating a serious public health risk for consumers.”) (footnote 
omitted); Franziska Busse et al., Lead Poisoning Due to Adulterated Marijuana, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1641 (2008); David Christiana, Vaping-Induced Lung Injury, NEW ENG. J. MED., Sept. 6, 2019, 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMe1912032?articl eTools=true; Tista Ghosh et al., The 
Public Health Framework of Legalized Marijuana in Colorado, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 21, 23 (2016); 
Todd Subritzky et al., Issues in the Implementation and Evolution of the Commercial Recreational 
Cannabis Market in Colorado, 27 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 1, 6 (2016); Schubart, supra note 96; Larkin, 
Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 346 n.81. 
107  See, e.g., THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at 83–97 (discussing quality control and reli-
ability assurance problems with proposing botanical cannabis to be used as an FDA-approved drug); 
Throckmorton, House Cannabis Hearing, supra note 75, at 2 (“To date, the FDA has not approved a 
marketing application for cannabis for the treatment of any disease or condition.”). 
108  The FDA and World Health Organization recommend testing as part of good manufacturing 
practices. See THOMAS & ELSOHLY, supra note 63, at 64. Unfortunately, there are businesses that won’t. 
See, e.g., FRYE & SMITHERMAN, supra note 73, at 53 (“While there are some legitimate pesticide-free 
cannabis growers, for the most part, when cannabis is grown outside of state regulatory guidelines, the 
plants are typically laden with pesticides.”). 
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administrative seizure by the FDA, as well as civil action or criminal prosecution by 
the U.S. Department of Justice.109 
Given the dreadful number of opioid overdose fatalities the nation has suffered 
over the last decade, perhaps there would be a justification for treating marijuana 
differently if it were a legitimate therapeutic substitute for opioids.110 If legislation 
involves a choice between evils, the harms of increased marijuana use might be less 
than the devastation that we have experienced by witnessing more opioid overdose 
deaths than the number of fatalities the nation suffered in World Wars I and II 
combined.111 Unfortunately, that choice is not on the table if we are to remain honest. 
Cannabis is not sufficiently powerful to alleviate serious acute pain and is not a 
legitimate palliative for chronic pain, certainly not in a smokable or edible form.112 
In fact, cannabis use worsens the already severe problems besetting people who are 
 
109  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333, 334 & 335b (2018); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 
339 U.S. 594 (1950); CASARETT, supra note 73; Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 344–49. 
110  Some have made that argument. See, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. REPORT, supra note 25, at 909 (“Con-
clusion 4-1 There is substantial evidence that cannabis or cannabinoids is an effective treatment for 
chronic pain in adults.”); Marcus A. Bachluber et al., Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic 
Overdose Mortality in the United States, 1999–2010, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1668 (2014); see 
generally Larkin & Madras, supra note 94, at 570–71 & nn.58–61 (collecting studies so arguing). 
111  Larkin & Madras, supra note 94, at 557. 
112  See Abhiram R. Bhashyam et al., Self-Reported Marijuana Use Is Associated with Increased 
Use of Prescription Opioids Following Traumatic Musculoskeletal Injury, 100 J. BONE & JOINT SUR-
GERY 2095, 2096 (2018); Fiona A. Campbell et al., Are Cannabinoids an Effective and Safe Treatment 
in the Management of Pain? A Qualitative Systematic Review, 323 BRITISH MED’L J. 1, 6 (2001); Rus-
sell Noyes, Jr. et al., Analgesic Effect of Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol, 15 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOL-
OGY 139, 139 (1975); David Raft et al., Effects of Intravenous Tetrahydrocannabinol on Experimental 
and Surgical Pain, 21 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 26 (1977); see generally Larkin & 
Madras, supra note 94, at 571–89 & n.95. 
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physically dependent on, or addicted to, opioids.113 Legalizing botanical marijuana 
use will not mitigate the opioid crisis.114 
The argument to the contrary is not persuasive. Yes, smokable marijuana can 
alleviate some pain through its euphoric effect. But so does bourbon, and that does 
not make a distilled spirit into a medication. That’s not just my opinion; it’s also the 
opinion of Dr. Peter Bach, a physician and Director of the Center for Health Policy 
and Outcomes at the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center.115 In his words, 
“[c]laims that marijuana relieves pain may be true. But the clinical studies that have 
been done compare it with a placebo, not even a pain reliever like ibuprofen. That’s 
not the type of rigorous evaluation we pursue for medications.” Moreover, “every 
 
113  See, e.g., Gabrielle Campbell et al., Effect of Cannabis Use in People with Chronic Non-
Cancer Pain Prescribed Opioids: Findings from a 4-Year Prospective Cohort Study, 3 LANCET PUB. 
HEALTH 341 (2018); Theodore L. Caputi, Medical Marijuana, Not Miracle Marijuana: Some Well-
Publicized Studies about Medical Marijuana Do Not Pass a Reality Check, 114 ADDICTION 1128 
(2019); Theodore L. Caputi & Keith Humphreys, Medical Marijuana Users Are More Likely to Use 
Prescription Drugs Medically and Nonmedically, 12 J. ADDICTION MED. 295 (2018); Wayne Hall et 
al., It Is Premature to Expand Access to Medicinal Cannabis in Hopes of Solving the US Opioid Crisis, 
113 ADDICTION 987 (2018); Deborah S. Hasin et al., U.S. Adults with Pain: A Group Increasingly 
Vulnerable to Nonmedical Cannabis Use and Cannabis Use Disorder: 2001–2002 and 2012–2013, 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY (Jan. 22, 2020), https://ajp.psychiatryo 
nline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.ajp.2019.19030284; Heather McBrien et al., Cannabis Use during Metha-
done Maintenance Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 7 
CMAJ OPEN E665 (2019); Shannon Nugent et al., The Effects of Cannabis Among Adults with Chronic 
Pain and an Overview of General Harms: A Systematic Review, 167 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 319 
(2017); Mark Olfson et al., Cannabis Use and Risk of Prescription Opioid Use Disorder in the United 
States, 175 AM J. PSYCHIATRY 47 (2018); Mark Olfson et al., Medical Marijuana and the Opioid Epi-
demic: Response to Theriault and Schlesinger, 175 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 284 (2018); Chelsea L. Shover 
et al., Association between Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Overdose Mortality Has Reversed over 
Time, PNAS (June 10, 2019), https://www.pnas.org/con-
tent/pnas/early/2019/06/04/1903434116.full.pdf; see generally Larkin & Madras, supra note 94, at 
589–90. 
114  In 2017, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine issued a report on 
the various alleged health effects of marijuana. NAT’L ACAD. REPORT, supra note 25, at 13–22 (sum-
mary of the report’s conclusions). Among the report’s conclusions were that there is conclusive or 
substantial evidence that cannabis is effective for treatment of chronic pain in adults. Id. at 13. The 
report, however, predated the 2018, 2019, and 2020 studies cited above in notes 112 and 113. The bases 
on which the National Academies relied are also subject to serious challenge. Kevin P. Hill, Medical 
Use of Cannabis in 2019, 322 JAMA 974, 974 (2019) (“The panel relied on a single meta-analysis of 
28 studies, few of which were from the United States, that assessed a variety of diseases and com-
pounds. Although they concluded that cannabinoids effectively managed pain, the CIs [viz., Confi-
dence Intervals] associated with these findings were large, suggesting unreliability in the meta-analysis 
results.”). Otherwise, the report found limited or no evidence that smoking marijuana has any positive 
health benefits (but can have some negative ones).  NAT’L ACAD. REPORT, supra note 25, at 13–22. 
115  Peter B. Bach, If Weed Is Medicine, So Is Budweiser, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2019, 7:23 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-weed-is-medicine-so-is-budweiser-11547770981. 
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intoxicant would pass that sort of test because you don’t experience pain as acutely 
when you are high. If weed is a pain reliever, so is Budweiser.”116 Amen. 
For some time now, the FDA has concluded that botanical cannabis is not a 
safe, effective, and pure drug for purposes of the FDCA.117 It is not alone. Other 
allied federal public health agencies—such as the Department of Health and Human 
Services,118 the Office of the U.S. Surgeon General,119 the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration,120 and the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse121—have consistently found that smoking marijuana is not a legitimate 
 
116  Id.; see also Charles Krauthammer, Pot as Medicine, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 1997), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1997/02/07/pot-as-medicine/84704a96-39b8-
485e-96e1-08e798569f05/ (“Take any morally dubious proposition—like assisting a suicide—and pre-
tend it is merely help for the terminally ill, and you are well on your way to legitimacy and a large 
public following. That is how assisted suicide is sold. That is how the legalization of marijuana is sold. 
Indeed, that is precisely how Proposition 215, legalizing marijuana for medical use, passed last No-
vember in California . . . . Marijuana gives them a buzz, all right. But medical effects? Be serious. The 
medical effects of marijuana for these conditions are nil. They are, as everyone involved in the enter-
prise knows—and as many behind Prop 215 intended—a fig leaf for legalization.”).  
117  See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS AND CANNABIS-DE-
RIVED PRODUCTS, INCLUDING CANNABIDIOL (CBD) (Oct. 16, 2019); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHAT 
YOU NEED TO KNOW (AND WHAT WE’RE WORKING TO FIND OUT) ABOUT PRODUCTS CONTAINING CAN-
NABIS OR CANNABIS-DERIVED COMPOUNDS, INCLUDING CBD (July 17, 2019); Gottlieb Statement, supra 
note 75. 
118  See, e.g., HHS Sec’y Alex M. Azar II, Remarks on Surgeon General’s Marijuana Advisory, 
Press Conf. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about/leadership/secretary/s peeches/2019-
speeches/remarks-on-surgeon-general-marijuana-advisory.html (“Especially as the potency of mariju-
ana has risen dramatically over the past several decades, we don’t know everything we might want to 
know about this drug. But we do know a number of things: It is a dangerous drug. For many, it can be 
addictive. And it is especially dangerous for adolescents and pregnant women, because of what we 
know about how it affects the developing brain. We need to be clear: Some states’ laws on marijuana 
may have changed, but the science has not, and federal law has not.”) (internal paragraphing omitted); 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON PROCEDURES FOR THE PROVISION OF MARIJU-
ANA FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH (May 21, 1999); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF 
POPULATION AFFS., RISKS OF ADOLESCENT MARIJUANA USE (Apr. 8, 2019). 
119  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN’L, U.S. SUR-
GEON GENERAL’S ADVISORY: MARIJUANA USE AND THE DEVELOPING BRAIN (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.hhs.gov/surgeongeneral/reports-and-publications/addiction-and-substance-misuse/advi-
sory-on-marijuana-use-and-developing-brain/index.html; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN’L, THE SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING ON MARIJUANA (Aug. 13, 1982), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001143.htm. 
120  See, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (SAMHSA), MARIJUANA 
RISKS (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.samhsa.gov/marijuana. 
121  See, e.g., NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE (July 2019), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/marijuana-medicine (“Why isn’t the marijuana 
plant an FDA-approved medicine? The FDA requires carefully conducted studies (clinical trials) in 
hundreds to thousands of human subjects to determine the benefits and risks of a possible medication. 
So far, researchers haven't conducted enough large-scale clinical trials that show that the benefits of 
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medical treatment and carries substantial risks. In sum, the expert federal agencies 
have rejected the argument that Congress and the electorate should approve 
smokable marijuana as a legitimate drug. We reject their judgment at our peril. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The bottom line is this: Commercially sold marijuana lacks the features of a 
drug that modern medicine and federal law demand. There is no good reason to 
depart from the eighty-year consensus that only the Commissioner of Food and 
Drugs—not state versions of that agency, let alone state legislatures or state voters, 
or even Congress for that matter—has the expertise to approve the large-scale 
production, distribution, and prescription of drugs for medical treatment. We should 
correct the error that we made in 1970 by not leaving to the FDA the decision 
whether to medicalize cannabis. I, therefore, agree with what Doctors Gary Reisfield 
and Bob DuPont have written in this regard. Anyone who recommends that the ill 
or disabled smoke marijuana for whatever symptomatic relief it might offer, even if 
motivated by a desire to alleviate the suffering of others, mistakenly equates human 
empathy with scientific validity. “Caring without science is well-intentioned 
kindness, but not medicine.”122 
 
III. RECREATIONAL-USE MARIJUANA 
 
A. Questions Congress Should Answer 
 
We now come to the real issue: Should Congress legalize the recreational use 
of marijuana and regulate its distribution, perhaps in a manner similar to the way 
that Congress and the states superintend the sale of tobacco and alcohol? That 
question is a difficult one. To do the job responsibly, Congress would need to 
demand, insofar as possible, objective answers to a number of hotly disputed 
 
the marijuana plant (as opposed to its cannabinoid ingredients) outweigh its risks in patients it's meant 
to treat.”). 
122  Reisfield & DuPont, supra note 74, at 868 (quoting BERNARD LOWN, THE LOST ART OF HEAL-
ING: PRACTICING COMPASSION IN MEDICINE (1996)). Unfortunately, there are two potential downsides 
to the approach suggested here. One is that the nomination hearings for persons to head HHS, FDA, 
NIDA, and the like could become as toxic as Supreme Court nomination hearings have become over 
the last three decades, with interest groups and senators trying to exact commitments from nominees 
or torch their reputations. See, e.g., MOLLIE HEMINGWAY & CARRIE SEVERINO, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE 
KAVANAUGH CONFIRMATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT (2019). Unfortunately, because 
we cannot extract politics from politics, there is no obvious way to avoid that problem. The other is 
that subjecting medical-use cannabis to FDA regulation but allowing recreational-use marijuana to be 
sold under another regimen might discourage pharmaceutical companies from investing in research 
into the potential beneficial properties of cannabinoids. See Patricia J. Zettler & Erika Lietzan, A Spe-
cial Exception for CBD in Foods and Supplements, 25 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 467 (2020). 
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questions where there is no consensus regarding the socially optimal result.123 
Among them are the following: 
 
• Would marijuana legalization increase the number of people who consume 
marijuana, the amount of cannabis they consume, and the number of people 
harmed by its consumption?124 
• Is heavy or long-term marijuana use more, less, or equally harmful, physically 
and psychologically, as the comparable use of tobacco or alcohol (and is 
marijuana a complement to or substitute for those other drugs)?125 
 
123  For a concise summary of the competing arguments, compare Tamar Todd, The Benefits of 
Marijuana Legalization and Regulation 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99 (2018) (summarizing the pro-
legalization case), with Kevin A. Sabet, Marijuana and Legalization Impacts, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. 
L. 84 (2018) (summarizing the anti-legalization case). For a recent collection of different views, Mari-
juana and America’s Health: Questions and Issues for Policy Makers, Hearing Before the U.S. Senate 
Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control, 116th Cong. (Oct. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Senate Int’l Narcotics 
Control Hearing] (collecting statements of U.S. Surgeon Gen’l Jerome Adams; NIDA Dir. Nora 
Volkow; Robert Fitzgerald, Prof. of Pathology U. of Calif.-San Diego; Staci Gruber, Assoc. Prof. of 
Psychiatry Harvard Med’l School; Sean Hennessy, Prof. of Epidemiology, U. Penn. Perelman School 
of Med.; and Madeline Meier, Ass’t Prof. of Psychiatry Ariz. St. U.). 
124  See, e.g., Caulkins, Weed Industry, supra note 23 (“As policy liberalized, cannabis trans-
formed from a weekend party drug to a daily habit, becoming more like tobacco smoking and less like 
drinking. The number of Americans who self-report using cannabis daily or near-daily grew from 0.9 
million in 1992 to 7.9 million in 2016.”); Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health, supra note 23, at 
76–77 (“Over the past quarter-century, the population of ‘current’ (past-month) users has more than 
doubled (to 22 million) and the fraction of those users who report daily or near-daily use has more than 
tripled (to about 35%). Those daily or near-daily users account for about 80% of the total cannabis 
consumed. Between a third and a half of them report the symptoms of Cannabis Use Disorder: They’re 
using more, or more frequently, than they intended to; they’ve tied to cut back or quit and failed; can-
nabis use is interfering with their other interests and responsibilities; and it’s causing conflict with 
people they care about.”). A major cause of increased marijuana use is commercialization. See 
Caulkins, Weed Industry, supra, note 23 (“use in Colorado rose not when its medical-marijuana law 
passed in 2000, but when dispensaries proliferated in 2009”); Andrew A. Monte et al., The Implications 
of Marijuana Legalization in Colorado, 313 JAMA 241, 241 (2150). 
125  Overuse and misuse of alcohol has ruined the lives of countless individuals and has cost 
society billions of dollars in medical, economic, and social expenses. Driving under the influence of 
alcohol has led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and serious injuries. Alcohol is also a criminogenic 
drug—viz., by loosening inhibitions it allows people to commit crimes, which gives rise to an entirely 
different category of costs. See, e.g., Larkin, 24/7 Sobriety and Hope, supra note 2, at 42–46. Smoking 
cigarettes has caused millions of deaths and has cost individuals and the nation billions of dollars. See, 
e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A REPORT OF THE OFF. OF THE SURGEON GENERAL: THE 
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—50 YEARS OF PROGRESS 11–12, 623–42 (2014); CNTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SMOKING AND TOBACCO USE: TOBACCO-RELATED MORTALITY (Apr. 
28, 2020), https://www.cdc.g ov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/health_effects/tobacco_re-
lated_mortality/index.htm (“Cigarette smoking causes about one of every five deaths in the United 
States each year. Cigarette smoking is estimated to cause the following: More than 480,000 deaths 
annually (including deaths from secondhand smoke).”) (footnotes and internal punctuation omitted); 
id. (“Cigarette smoking causes premature death: Life expectancy for smokers is at least 10 years shorter 
than for nonsmokers.”) (internal punctuation omitted); Prabhat Jha et al., 21st-Century Hazards of 
Smoking and Benefits of Cessation in the United States, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 341 (2013). Marijuana 
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• What effect will legalization have on the lives of the adults who smoke 
regularly and on their families?126 
 
is also a potentially harmful substance. See, e.g., Nora D. Volkow, Marijuana and Medicine: The Need 
for a Science-Based Approach, in 2 PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADDICTION MEDICINE 23, 28 
(Mark Sanford & Donald Avoy ed., 2009); HALL & PACULA, supra note 25; James C. Anthony et al., 
Comparative Epidemiology of Dependence on Tobacco, Alcohol, Controlled Substances, and Inhal-
ants: Basic Findings from the National Comorbidity Survey, 2 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHO-
PHARMACOLOGY 244, 251 (1994) (relative percentages of individuals who become dependent after try-
ing tobacco (32 percent), alcohol (15 percent), and marijuana (9 percent)); Wayne Hall, What Has 
Research over the Past Two Decades Revealed about the Adverse Health Effects of Recreational Can-
nabis Use?, 110 ADDICTION 19 (2014); Deborah S. Hasin et al., Prevalence of Marijuana Use Disor-
ders in the United States Between 2001–2002 and 2012–2013, 72 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 1235 (2015). 
The THC content of marijuana is materially higher than in yesteryear, and new inhalation methods—
such as “dabbing” (viz., inhalation of concentrate through using butane)—exacerbate the potential 
harms. See, e.g., Mahmoud A. ElSohly et al., Changes in Cannabis Potency Over the Last 2 Decades 
(1995-2014): Analysis of Current Data in the United States, 79 BIO. PSYCHIATRY 613 (2016); John M 
Stogner & Bryan Lee Miller, Assessing the Dangers of “Dabbing”: Mere Marijuana or Harmful New 
Trend?, 136 PEDIATRICS 1 (2015). “Experimental” or infrequent use (particularly long ago) is a differ-
ent matter. Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 328 & n.31 (collecting authorities); see Caulkins, 
Marijuana Dangers, supra note 23, at 22; id. at 29-30 (“While alcohol is more dangerous in terms of 
acute overdose risk, and also in terms of promoting violence and chronic organ failure, marijuana—at 
least as now used in the United States—creates higher rates of behavioral problems, including depend-
ence, among all its users. Furthermore, even if it were possible to ascertain that alcohol is more dan-
gerous than marijuana or vice versa, that fact would be of no particular relevance. Very few people 
systematically research the pros and cons of various dependence-inducing intoxicants and then decide 
to consume just one. Most people who use marijuana also drink alcohol, and the two are often used 
together.”). 
126  See, e.g., NIDA, MARIJUANA, supra note 85, at 25 (“Several studies have linked marijuana 
use to increased risk for psychiatric disorders, including psychosis (schizophrenia), depression, anxiety, 
and substance use disorders, but whether and to what extent it actually causes these conditions is not 
always easy to determine. Recent research suggests that smoking high-potency marijuana every day 
could increase the chances of developing psychosis by nearly five times compared to people who have 
never used marijuana. The amount of drug used, the age at first use, and genetic vulnerability have all 
been shown to influence this relationship. The strongest evidence to date concerns links between ma-
rijuana use and psychiatric disorders in those with a preexisting genetic or other vulnerability.”) (foot-
notes omitted); GEORGE F. KOOB ET AL., DRUGS, ADDICTION, AND THE BRAIN 306 (2014) (“Marijuana 
smoke may also have the same potential toxicity as cigarette smoke with regard to lung function.”); 
Caulkins, Weed Industry, supra note 23 (“The pro-marijuana movement celebrates legalization as a 
triumph following in the footsteps of civil rights, women’s rights, and homosexual rights. That is juve-
nile. Although most marijuana users have no problems with the drug, most sales and profits flow from 
people who consume so much that it interferes with their lives. The typical session of marijuana use is 
part of a bad habit, if not a diagnosable substance-use disorder.”); Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra 
note 23, at 22 (“The essential problem with marijuana is neither death from overdose nor organ failure 
from chronic use. Marijuana might better be described as a performance-degrading drug and, more 
dangerously, as a temptation commodity with habituating tendencies.”); id. at 23–25 (“Since 4.2 mil-
lion people are estimated to meet the criteria for marijuana abuse or dependence, there is one such 
person for every 4.8 current users. Or, expressing the ratio the other way around, 21% of current users 
meet diagnostic criteria . . . . [W]ithin the context of aggregate use in the United States at this time, the 
best available data suggest that marijuana creates abuse and dependence at higher rates than does alco-
hol”); Larkin & Madras, supra note 94, at 581 (“According to eleven systematic reviews and thirty-
two primary studies, marijuana-use harms include increased risk for motor vehicle accidents, psychotic 
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• What short- and long-term effects will legalization have on the lives of the 
adolescents who pick up the habit?127 
• What number of new users will become addicted to cannabis or suffer from 
mental disorders due to heavy or long-term use?128 
• What is the risk that marijuana will serve as a so-called “gateway” drug?129 
• What regulatory model would best work for marijuana: viz., the one currently 
used for tobacco or alcohol, or something entirely different?130 
 
symptoms, amotivational syndrome, and short-term cognitive impairment.”) (footnote omitted). It 
turns out that a small number of people consume the vast majority of marijuana. See, e.g., Caulkins, 
Marijuana Dangers, supra note 23, at 29 (“Those who report using every single day, on the other hand, 
account for 45% of the reported days of use and more than 50% of the weight consumed. Since daily 
users are thought to consume (on average) the equivalent of three to four joints per day, it seems liter-
ally true that the average gram of marijuana is consumed by someone who is under the influence of 
marijuana more than half of all their waking hours.”); Mark Kleiman, How Not To Make a Hash Out 
of Cannabis Legalization, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (2014), https://washingtonmonthly.com/maga-
zine/marchaprilmay-2014/how-not-to-make-a-hash-out-of-cannabis-legalization/ (“Cannabis con-
sumption, like alcohol consumption, follows the so-called 80/20 rule (sometimes called ‘Pareto’s 
Law’): 20 percent of the users account for 80 percent of the volume.”). Another way to put the inquiry 
is this: What weight should we give to the likelihood that legalization might ruin the lives of perhaps 
20 percent of long-term marijuana users? 
127  See, e.g., SAMHSA, an arm of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, has 
found that teenage marijuana use has increased in Colorado but not in Washington from 2011-2015. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SAMHSA, HHS Publication No. SMA–17–Baro–16–
States–CO (2017); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SAMHSA, HHS Publication No. SMA–
17–Baro–16–States–WA (2017). As for the effect of long-term use beginning in adolescence, there 
seems to be unanimity that there is a serious risk of long-term problems. See, e.g., NIDA, MARIJUANA, 
supra note 85, at 2–3; WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CAN-
NABIS USE 15–16 (2016); see generally Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 324–28 & nn.28–33 
(collecting authorities). 
128  See, e.g., NIDA, MARIJUANA, supra note 85, at 2–3; Alan J. Budney et al., Cannabis, 
LOWINSON AND RUIZ’S SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 214, 227–28, 233 (Pedro 
Ruiz & Eric Strain eds., 5th ed. 2011); Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 325 n.29 (collecting 
scientific studies and reports). 
129  See, e.g., NIDA, MARIJUANA, supra note 85, at 21 (“Some research suggests that marijuana 
use is likely to precede use of other licit and illicit substances and the development of addiction to other 
substances.”) (footnote omitted); NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA: DRUGFACTS (last updated 
Dec. 2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts /marijuanaa#ref; compare, e.g., Rob-
erto Secades-Villa et al., Probability and Predictors of the Cannabis Gateway Effect: A National Study, 
26 INT’L J. DRUG POLICY 135 (2015) (finding a gateway effect), with, e.g., Stephen Nkansah-Amankra 
& Mark Minelli, “Gateway Hypothesis” and Early Drug Use: Additional Findings from a Population-
Based Sample of Adolescents to Adulthood, 4 PREVENTATIVE MED. REPORTS 134 (2016) (finding no 
gateway effect). 
130  For example, one model might be the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009), which authorizes the FDA to regulate the distribution of 
tobacco products. Unfortunately, federal and state regulatory laws mean little if the government does 
not enforce them, as has happened in some states that have legalized marijuana use. See, e.g., GAO, 
STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 36; OR. SEC’Y OF STATE AUDITS DIV., OREGON’S 
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• What level of government—federal, state, or local, or perhaps all three—should 
be permitted to tax the cultivation, processing, and sale of marijuana, and how, 
if at all, will taxation affect the availability of cannabis on the black market?131 
• Will legalization increase state coffers from new sales tax revenues or create a 
deficit from new expenses, such as increased emergency room visits?132 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING MARIJUANA SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED TO BETTER MITIGATE DIVER-
SION RISK AND IMPROVE LABORATORY TESTING (Jan. 2019). 
131  Compare, e.g., COLO. LEGIS. COUNCIL, INTERIM STUDY COMM., LEGALIZED MARIJUANA 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: REPORT TO THE COLORADO GEN’L ASSEMBLY (Dec. 2016); COLORADO DEP’T 
OF REVENUE, MARIJUANA TAX DATA (Oct. 2019) (reporting (approximately) $223 million in overall 
revenue from marijuana sales for FY 2019 (Jan. 1 to Sept. 30, 2019) and (approximately) $1.2 billion 
since February 1, 2014 (when the Colorado Department of Revenue began reporting data)), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/revenue/colorado-marijuana-tax-data, and JANE G. GRAVELLE & 
SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43785, FEDERAL PROPOSALS TO TAX MARIJUANA: AN ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS (Nov. 13, 2014), with, e.g., CENTENNIAL INST., ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS OF LE-
GALIZED MARIJUANA 3 (2018) (“For every dollar gained in tax revenue, Coloradans spend approxi-
mately $4.50 to mitigate the effects of legalization. Costs related to the healthcare system and from 
high school dropouts are the largest cost contributors, but many other costs were included as well. Costs 
of marijuana ranged from accidental poisonings and traffic fatalities to increased court costs for im-
paired drivers, juvenile use, and employer related costs.”). 
132  See GOGEK, supra note 1, at 131–40 (arguing that marijuana legalization supporters overes-
timate the tax revenues and underestimate its direct and indirect costs, such as increased healthcare 
expenses and lost productivity); see also, e.g., JEFF CHAPMAN ET AL., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FORE-
CASTS HAZY FOR STATE MARIJUANA REVENUE (Aug. 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/issue-briefs/2019/08/forecastts-hazy-for-state-marijuana-revenue (noting the difficulty of 
projecting demand and revenues) (noting the difficulty of projecting demand and revenues); Katelyn 
E. Hall et al., Mental-health Related Emergency Department Visits Associated with Cannabis in Colo-
rado, 25 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 526, 531 (2018) (“Colorado experienced a fivefold greater preva-
lence of mental health diagnoses in ED visits with cannabis-related diagnostic codes compared to ED 
visits without cannabis-related diagnostic codes.”); Howard S. Kim et al., Marijuana Tourism and 
Emergency Department Visits in Colorado, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 797, 798 (2016) (“ED visits related 
to cannabis use appear to be increasing more rapidly among out-of-state residents than among Colorado 
residents[.]”), Howard S. Kim et al., Cyclic Vomiting Presentations Following Marijuana Liberaliza-
tion in Colorado, 22 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 694, 694 (2015) (“The prevalence of cyclic vomiting 
presentations nearly doubled after the liberalization of medical marijuana.”); Andrew A. Monte et al., 
Acute Illnesses Associated with Cannabis Use, by Route of Exposure, 170 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 531 
(2019); Monte et al., supra note 124, at 241–42 (legalization in Colorado is associated with an increase 
in emergency room usage for problems such as marijuana intoxication, exacerbation of underlying 
psychotic condition, burns, and cyclic vomiting syndrome); George Sam Wang et al., Marijuana and 
Acute Care Health Contacts in Colorado, 104 PREVENTATIVE MED. 24 (2017) (finding that marijuana 
legalization in Colorado is correlated with trend of increasing emergency room visits and poison con-
trol center calls); George Sam Wang et al., Unintentional Pediatric Exposures to Marijuana in Colo-
rado, 2009-2015, 170 JAMA PEDIATRICS e160971 (2016) (concluding that the increase in emergency 
room visits and regional poison control center calls in the years after marijuana legalization in Colorado 
was due to legalization); George Sam Wang et al., Association of Unintentional Pediatric Exposures 
with Decriminalization of Marijuana in the United State, 63 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY. MED. 684 (2014) 
(the nationwide rate of pediatric exposures to marijuana was low, but increased from 2005 to 2011); 
He Zhu & Li-Tzy Wu, Trends and Correlates of Cannabis-Involved Emergency Department Visits: 
132                         OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW               Vol: 18.1:99 
• How should we deal with the problem that people will consume marijuana in 
reliance on medical advice offered by marijuana dispensary “budtenders,” by 
internet websites, or by each other?133 
• What effect would permitting recreational marijuana use have on the criminal 
justice system?134 
 
2004-2011, 10 J. ADDICTION MED. 429 (2016) (finding a notable increase in emergency room visits 
attributable to consumption of cannabis alone or with other drugs). 
133  For example, pregnant women should not use marijuana. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL AD-
VISORY, supra note 119; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MARIJUANA AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH (Mar. 16, 2018); AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, CLINICAL REPORT: MARIJUANA USE DURING PREG-
NANCY AND BREASTFEEDING: IMPLICATIONS FOR NEONATAL AND CHILDHOOD OUTCOMES, 142 PEDIAT-
RICS No. 3 e20181889 (Sept. 2018) [hereinafter AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, CLINICAL REPORT]; AM. COL-
LEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON OBSTETRIC PRAC., ACOG COMM. OPINION NO. 
722 (2017); COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, MONITORING HEALTH CONCERNS RELATED TO MA-
RIJUANA 23 (2018); Nora D. Volkow et al., Self-Reported Medical and Nonmedical Cannabis Use 
Among Pregnant Women in the United States, 322 JAMA 167 (2019); Nora D. Volkow et al., The Risks 
of Marijuana Use During Pregnancy, 317 JAMA 129 (2017).  No form of regulation, however, might 
keep some retail clerks (called “bud-tenders”) from mistakenly recommending that pregnant women 
use marijuana to avoid morning sickness. See, e.g., Betsy Dickson et al., Recommendations from Can-
nabis Dispensaries About First-Trimester Cannabis Use, 131 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1031 
(2018); Lisa Rapaport, Many Cannabis Dispensaries Recommend Pot to Pregnant Women, REUTERS 
(May 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-morningsickness-marijuana/many-cannabis-
dispensaries-recommend-pot-to-pregnant-women-idUSKBN1IA3BR; Michael Nedelman, Marijuana 
Shops Recommend Marijuana to Pregnant Women, Against Doctors’ Warnings, CNN (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/10/health/cannabis-marijuana-dispensaries-pregnan cy-study/in-
dex.html (noting that about 70% of cannabis shops in Colorado recommend marijuana to pregnant 
women for morning sickness); see also, e.g., AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, CLINICAL REPORT, supra (noting 
that “marijuana [is being] touted on the Internet as a safe treatment of nausea during pregnancy”). The 
FDA and federal law enforcement agencies, however, should try. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 
122, 143 (1975) (ruling that it is illegal for a physician to distribute controlled substances outside the 
boundaries of professional medical practice). 
134  Parties arguing in favor of revising the CSA point to studies finding that police enforcement 
of laws banning recreational cannabis use have a disparate impact on racial and ethnic minorities. See, 
e.g., REPORT OF THE NYPD WORKING GROUP, ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW PROHIBITING PUBLIC BURN-
ING OF MARIJUANA IN NEW YORK CITY 5–8 (June 15, 2018) [hereinafter NYPD Report], 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2018/marijuana-report-
20180619.pdf; Eric Bond et al., Marijuana Enforcement in New York State, 1970-2017, Research 
Brief, Eric Bond et al., John Jay College of Crim. Just., Marijuana Enforcement in New York State, 
1970-2017, 1, 5 (Feb. 2019), https://datacollaborativeforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/RE-
SEARCH_BRIEF_FIN AL.pd; Smart Approaches to Marijuana, Lessons Learned from Legalization 
in Four U.S. States and DC 4, 28 (Mar. 2018) [hereinafter SAM, Lessons Learned from Legalization], 
https://learnaboutsam.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/SAM-Lessons-Learned-From-Marijuana-Le-
galization-Digital.pdf (all making that finding). The Constitution prohibits only intentional racial dis-
crimination, not actions with only a discriminatory effect. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
676–77 (2009); Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory 
purpose,’ however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences . . . . It 
implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course 
of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.”) (citation and footnotes omitted). Nonetheless, a law enforcement practice with a disparate 
racial impact is troubling. At the same time, it is important to analyze such findings, because they might 
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• Given the large number of state medical and recreational marijuana programs 
and the large-scale marijuana business that has developed since 1996, is the 
current federal ban sustainable?135 




rest on incomplete information or obscure relevant, race-neutral explanations. For example, there is 
evidence that marijuana stores are disproportionately situated in some minority communities, see SAM, 
Lessons Learned from Legalization, supra, at 29 (“An overlay of socioeconomic data with the geo-
graphic location of pot shops in Denver shows marijuana stores are located primarily in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods.”), and that juvenile offenders might be unaware of the distinction between private and 
public marijuana use, id. at 26 (referring to data from Colorado and Alaska: “Many young people hear 
the message that ‘pot is legal,’ but are unaware (or unconcerned) that public use is not.”). Moreover, 
the NYPD report cited above states that pre-2017 data do not distinguish between arrests for simple 
possession and “public burning”—that is, smoking in public. “This distinction is important because it 
is typically burning marijuana in public or sale, and not mere possession in public view, that generates 
calls from the public for the police to take action.” NYPD Report, supra, at 4. In addition, studies noting 
the racial disparity may elide the difference between (1) the crime that precipitated the arrest and (2) 
the addition of an independent charge for marijuana possession discovered during a search incident to 
the arrest. See GOGEK, supra note 1, at 107–09. Finally, when minorities are predominantly both the 
perpetrators and victims of crime in a neighborhood, the police cannot legitimately be criticized for 
enforcing laws that protect law-abiding minority residents. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & David Rosenthal, 
Flight, Race, and Terry Stops: Commonwealth v. Warren, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 194–225 
(2018). 
135  In 2019, Professor Kleiman concluded that the answer is, No. The cannabis industry has 
become too large for law enforcement to suppress it, and the businesses too wealthy for politicians to 
ignore them. Moreover, marijuana is easy to smuggle from states with liberalized schemes to one with-
out them. “The serious question is not whether to legalize cannabis, but how.” Kleiman, Marijuana 
and Public Health, supra note 23, at 69; see also, e.g., Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra note 23, 
at 32 (“It is clear we would all be better off if marijuana did not exist. Given the abundance of alterna-
tive sources of intoxication and fun, the harm suffered by abusers probably outweighs the pleasure 
derived by its controlled users. On the other hand, the paucity of third-party harms or ‘externalities’ 
undermines the standard justification for government intervention. A modern secular state does not 
arbitrarily declare some items to be forbidden and others to be halal or kosher. We are accustomed to 
mandates that protect against immediate, tangible physical-health harms, such as seat-belt laws, but 
many bridle against taxes on sodas or other social engineering designed to fight obesity or promote 
exercise. And the threats marijuana does pose are obstacles to nebulous objectives like ‘achieving one’s 
potential’ and bourgeois totems like academic and career success, not concrete harms like heart dis-
ease.”). 
136  Relevant here is the “precautionary principle,” the proposition that regulators should act cau-
tiously when the potential harm is great even if the likelihood of its occurrence is remote (or, put simply, 
it’s better to be safe than sorry). See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTION-
ARY PRINCIPLE (2005); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 851 (1996). The principle is relevant here because “cannabis policy has raced ahead of 
cannabis science,” Bleyer & Barnes, supra note 74, at 1280, and science recently has shown that some 
medical benefits are smaller and harms greater than expected, see, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 112; 
Caputi & Humphreys, supra note 113; see generally Larkin & Madras, supra note 94, at 581–92. 
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A short article cannot do justice to those questions. Answering any one of them 
might take an article by itself. There might be additional issues that arise once 
Congress begins to answer the ones I have suggested. Nonetheless, society should 
examine those issues, and Congress must answer them if it is to legislate responsibly. 
It is time for that debate to begin.  
To help that debate along, I will discuss one issue here: the problems that 
legalization will create for roadway safety. That issue merits consideration for three 
reasons. One is an increase in roadway crashes, maimings, and fatalities resulting 
from drivers who are “one toke over the line.”137 Legalization will lead to an increase 
in the number of people who smoke marijuana, some number of them will get behind 
the wheel while feeling its impairing effects, and a subset of that number will cause 
a crash. The nation has spent the last half-century trying to reduce the number of 
roadway crashes, maimings, and fatalities attributable to alcohol.138 We have not 
reduced that number to zero, but we have significantly reduced it by making it easier 
to identify and prosecute DUI-Alcohol cases and by changing the public’s attitude 
toward drunken driving.139 The cannabis legalization movement threatens to move 
the nation in the other direction. In fact, there is evidence that we have already done 
an about-face. A second reason why I will discuss the problem of DUI-Drugs is that 
this issue has not received remotely the same amount of consideration in academic 
journals that the claimed benefits of marijuana legalization already has. Whatever 
the nation decides to do about the CSA—“end it,” “mend it,” or leave the statute 
unchanged—we need to be aware of all the consequences of our decision, and this 
is a critical factor in that mix. Finally, the problem of DUI-Drugs is not limited to 
cannabis. Benzodiazepines, opioids, other hallucinogens—those and other drugs 
impair anyone’s ability to operate a motor vehicle safely.140 We need to be concerned 
with the use of any substance that degrades one’s operating ability. Cannabis just 
happens to be the substance de jour. 
 
137  Brewer & Shipley, “One Toke Over the Line” (Kama Sutra Records 1971). 
138  See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1989); BARRON H. 
LERNER, ONE FOR THE ROAD: DRUNK DRIVING SINCE 1900 (2011). 
139  See NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCI., ENG’G & MEDICINE, GETTING TO ZERO: ALCOHOL-IM-
PAIRED DRIVING FATALITIES (2018) [hereinafter GETTING TO ZERO]; Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra 
note 28, at 454–55. 
140  See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Robert L. DuPont & Bertha K. Madras, The Need to Treat Driv-
ing under the Influence of Drugs as Seriously as Driving under the Influence of Alcohol, THE HERITAGE 
FOUND., BACKGROUNDER No. 3316, at 4–5 (May 16, 2018), https://www.heritage.o rg/sites/de-
fault/files/2018-05/BG3316_1.pdf. 
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B. Drug Impaired Driving 
 
Numerous substances have psychoactive properties that hamper a person’s 
ability to drive safely.141 Alcohol has always been the principal worry because adults 
may lawfully purchase it and because it is still the most commonly used recreational 
drug.142 Alcohol-impaired driving has caused more deaths and disabilities each year 
than have some of the nation’s recent wars.143 
State marijuana legalization programs only worsen that problem. Why? Our 
choice is not whether to substitute THC-impaired driving for alcohol-impaired 
driving, but is whether to add the problems caused by the former atop those caused 
by the latter.144 Like ethanol, THC hampers a driver’s ability to quickly and 
effectively process information and implement decisions when responding to 
unexpected, rapidly unfolding roadway challenges,145 even after a considerable 
 
141  See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADM’N, DEP’T OF TRANSP., DRUG-IMPAIRED 
DRIVING (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drug-impaired-driving (“You can’t drive safely 
if you’re impaired. That’s why it’s illegal everywhere in America to drive under the influence of alco-
hol, marijuana, opioids, methamphetamines, or any potentially impairing drug-prescribed or over the 
counter.”) (last accessed June 22, 2020); MARCELLINE BURNS, MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF DRUGS 153 
(2003) (“Without exception, all illicit drugs have the potential to impair the cognitive and behavioral 
skills that allow a person to engage in normal daily activities, such as driving and working.”); MEYER 
& QUENZER, supra note 93; Tharaka L. Dassanayake et al., Effects of Benzodiazepines, Antidepressants 
and Opioids on Driving: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Epidemiological and Experimental 
Evidence, 34 DRUG SAFETY 125 (2011); Markku Linnoila, Tranquilizers and Driving, 8 ACCID. ANAL. 
& PREV. 15 (1976). 
142  Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 28, at 456 n.9; see generally GETTING TO ZERO, supra 
note 139. 
143  Compare NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., SAFETY FACTS: 
MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW 9 Tbl. 7 (Oct. 2019), https://crashstats.nhtsa.d ot.gov/Api/Pub-
lic/ViewPublication/812826 (in 2018, there were 10,511 alcohol-impaired driving fatalities) with U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CASUALTY STATUS (Apr. 2020), https://www.def ense.gov/casualty.pdf (recording 
4,431 fatalities in Operation Iraqi Freedom since Sept. 1, 2010, and 2,353 in Operation Enduring Free-
dom, which began in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001). 
144  Mark R. Rosekind et al., Reducing Impaired Driving Fatalities: Date Need to Drive Testing, 
Enforcement and Policy, JAMA INTERNAL MED. E1 (June 22, 2020), file:///C:/Users/larkinp/Down-
loads/jamainternal_rosekind_2020_ic_200012.pdf (“[E]very year more than 10,000 individuals die on 
US roads as a result of crashes in which a driver had a blood alcohol concentration of greater than 0.08 
g/dL, accounting for about one-third of motor vehicle crash deaths annually. As this significant alcohol-
impaired driving problem continues, public health and safety professionals are justifiably concerned 
by the introduction of an additional legal intoxicant into our communities and onto our roads.”) (foot-
note omitted). 
145  BRITISH MED. ASS’N, THERAPEUTIC USES OF CANNABIS 66 (1997) (“Impairment of psycho-
motor and cognitive performance, especially in complex tasks, has been shown in normal subjects in 
many tests. Impairments include slowed reaction time, short-term memory deficits, impaired attention, 
time and space distortion, and impaired coordination. These effects combine with the sedative effects 
to cause deleterious effects on driving ability or operation of machinery.”) (citations omitted) [herein-
after BRITISH MED. ASS’N, CANNABIS]; see also, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. REPORT, supra note 25, at 85–99, 
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period of abstinence.146 Moreover, a goodly number of people will use marijuana 
and drive,147 perhaps a greater number now than when its sale was unlawful 
nationwide.148 Finally, people often consume THC and alcohol together,149 which 
 
230; NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MARIJUANA 10, 12–13 
(Apr. 2020); Robert L. DuPont et al., Marijuana-Impaired Driving: A Path Through the Controversies, 
in CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA 183, 186 (Kevin A Sabet & Ken. C. Winters eds., 
2018) (“Today there is a wealth of evidence that marijuana is an impairing substance that affects skills 
necessary for safe driving.”); Wayne Hall, What Has Research Over the Past Two Decades Revealed 
About the Adverse Health Effects of Recreational Cannabis Use?, 110 ADDICTION 19, 21 (2014); Re-
becca L. Hartman & Marilyn A. Huestis, Cannabis Effects on Driving Skills, 59 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 
478 (2013). There is less of an adverse effect in simulators and when drivers perform simple on-road 
maneuvers, but “if speed increases, as it does on a highway, then reaction time can’t keep up,” and “if 
a driver faces multiple tasks . . . performance goes to hell pretty quickly.” CASARETT, supra note 73, at 
160; see generally Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 28, at 473–78 & nn. 87-103 (collecting stud-
ies). 
146  See, e.g., M. Kathryn Dahlgren et al., Recreational Cannabis Use Impairs Driving Perfor-
mance in the Absence of Acute Intoxication, 208 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 107771 (2020) (“The 
current study demonstrates residual driving impairment in nonintoxicated cannabis users, which ap-
pears specific to those with early onset cannabis use.”); DuPont et al., supra note 145, at 187 (“A study 
of chronic, daily marijuana users assessed over a three-week period of abstinence showed prolonged 
impairment of psychomotor function on critical tracking and divided attention tasks necessary for driv-
ing safely[.]”). 
147  See ALEJANDRO AZOFEIFA ET AL., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 68 MOR-
BIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1153, 1153 (Dec. 20, 2019) (“During 2018, 12 million (4.7%) U.S. 
residents reported driving under the influence of marijuana in the past 12 months; 2.3 million (0.9%) 
reported driving under the influence of illicit drugs other than marijuana. Driving under the influence 
was more prevalent among males and among persons aged 16–34 years.”); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: RESEARCH NOTE, RESULTS OF THE 
2013-2014 NATIONAL ROADSIDE SURVEY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE BY DRIVERS (Feb. 2015) (stating 
that almost twenty percent of drivers tested positive for potentially impairing legal and illegal drugs 
other than alcohol) [hereinafter NHTSA 2013-2014 ROADSIDE SURVEY]; NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 811 415, DRUG INVOLVEMENT OF FATALLY INJURED 
DRIVERS 1 (2010) (“Nationwide in 2009, 63 percent of fatally injured drivers were tested for the pres-
ence of drugs. Overall, 3,952 fatally injured drivers tested positive for drug involvement in 2009. This 
number represents 18 percent of all fatally injured drivers (Table 1) and 33 percent of those with known 
drug test results (Table 2) in 2009.”); OREGON HEALTH AUTHORITY, MARIJUANA REPORT 62 (2016), , 
https://digital.osl.state.or.us/islandora/object/osl%3A95678/datastream/OBJ/view (noting that, in Ore-
gon in 2015, Drug Recognition Experts—viz., specially trained law enforcement officers—found that 
50 percent of all drivers they assessed were cannabis-impaired); DuPont, supra note 145, at 191. 
148  States like Colorado have seen a considerable increase in marijuana sales. Benjamin Hansen 
et al., Early Evidence on Recreational Marijuana Legalization and Traffic Fatalities, SSRN 19-20 
(Feb. 2018), http://faculty.washington.edu/ceweber/HMW_marijuana_traffic.pdf (“The amount of ma-
rijuana sold in recreational stores has grown dramatically, increasing . . . in Colorado . . . from 36,031 
pounds in 2014 to 102,871 pounds in 2016.”). In 2017, there were three million new marijuana users, 
one-third was under age nineteen, and one-third was college age. NAT’L FAMILIES IN ACTION, THE MA-
RIJUANA REPORT (Sept. 19, 2018). 
149  See, e.g., AZOFEIFA, supra note 147, at 1154 (“In a study of injured drivers aged 16–20 years 
evaluated at level 1 trauma centers in Arizona during 2008–2014, 10% of tested drivers were simulta-
neously positive for both alcohol and [THC].”) (footnote omitted); BECKY BUI & JACK K. REED, COLO. 
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multiplies the disabling effect of each drug on a person’s driving ability.150 The 
combination can render someone impaired when consuming either drug alone might 
not.151 
Consider the effect on roadway safety of Colorado’s 2000 and 2012 decisions 
to legalize marijuana for medical and recreational use, respectively.152 The data 
 
DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL: A REPORT PURSU-
ANT TO HOUSE BILL 17-1315, at 7 (July 2018) (noting that in 2016 alcohol and THC are the most com-
mon drug combination in cases with test results); DARRIN T. GRONDELL ET AL., WASH. TRAFFIC SAFETY 
COMM’N, MARIJUANA USE, ALCOHOL USE, AND DRIVING IN WASHINGTON STATE 1–2 (Apr. 2018) 
(“Poly-drug drivers (combinations of alcohol and drugs or multiple drugs) is now the most common 
type of impairment among drivers in fatal crashes . . . . The most common substance in poly-drug driv-
ers is alcohol, followed by THC . . . . Since 2012, the number of poly-drug drivers involved in fatal 
crashes [has] increased an average of 15 percent every year . . . . By 2016, the number of poly-drug 
drivers [was] more than double the number of alcohol-only drivers and five times higher than the num-
ber of THC-only drivers involved in fatal crashes.”); ROCKY MTN. HIGH-INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING 
AREA STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE IMPACT, 
VOL. 6 SUPPLEMENT 10 (Sept. 2019) (chart depicting that sixty-six percent of the drivers who tested 
positive for marijuana also had used alcohol and that seventy-five percent of marijuana users also used 
alcohol and another drug) [hereafter ROCKY MTN. HIDTA 2019 REPORT]; CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra 
note 23, at 44 (“Marijuana users are much more likely than are nonusers to drink and to abuse alcohol. 
For example, current marijuana users are five times as likely as nonusers to meet DSM-IV criteria for 
alcohol abuse or dependence (26 percent versus 5 percent); that is, one in four current marijuana users 
is a problem drinker (calculated using 2012 NSDUH data using the SAMHSA online tool). Indeed, 
simultaneous use is common. The national household survey asks people what, if any, other substances 
they used the last time they drank alcohol. Among the 15.4 million people who used both alcohol and 
marijuana at some time in the past 30 days, 54 percent reported using marijuana along with alcohol the 
last time they drank, a proportion that rises to 83 percent among daily or near-daily marijuana users.”); 
ROBERT L. DUPONT, INST. FOR BEHAV. & HEALTH, IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE MARIJUANA DUID LAWS TO 
IMPROVE HIGHWAY SAFETY (Oct. 12, 2016); Johannes G. Ramaekers, Driving Under the Influence of 
Cannabis: An Increasing Public Health Concern, 319 JAMA 1433 (2018); see generally Larkin, 
Drugged Driving, supra note 28, at 478–79 & nn.104–07. The number of THC and ethanol users noted 
in those studies is likely low because the police often do not drug test a driver arrested for DUI, since 
testing is costly and a positive test result would not increase the punishment. See, e.g., ROCKY MTN. 
HIDTA 2019 REPORT, supra. 
150  See, e.g., BRITISH MED. ASS’N, CANNABIS, supra note 145, at 73 (noting the “additive effect” 
when marijuana and alcohol are combined); IVERSEN, supra note 100, at 96 (“It may be that the greatest 
risk of marijuana in this context is to amplify the impairment caused by alcohol when, as often happens, 
both drugs are taken together[.]”); R. Andrew Sewell et al., The Effect of Cannabis Compared with 
Alcohol on Driving, 18 AM. J. ADDICTION 185 (2009); see generally Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra 
note 28, at 478–80 & nn.105–08 (collecting authorities). 
151  See, e.g., Stanford Chihuri et al., Interaction of Marijuana and Alcohol on Fatal Motor Ve-
hicle Crash Risk: A Case-Control Study, 4 INJURY EPIDEMIOLOGY 8 (2017); Guohua Li et al., Role of 
Alcohol and Marijuana Use in the Initiation of Fatal Two-Vehicle Crashes, 27 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOL-
OGY 342 (2017). But see Julian Santaella-Tenorio et al., US Traffic Fatalities, 1985-2014, and Their 
Relationship to Medical Marijuana Laws, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 336 (2017) (finding a decrease in 
traffic fatalities in states with medical marijuana programs). 
152  See, e.g., ROCKY MTN. HIDTA 2019 REPORT, supra note 149, at 5–17; COLO. DEP’T OF PUB-
LIC SAFETY, DIV. OF CRIM. JUST., OFF. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, IMPACTS OF MARIJUANA 
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demonstrates a thirty-one percent increase in the number of traffic deaths (from 481 
in 2013 to 632 in 2018), and a 109 percent increase in the number of traffic deaths 
involving drivers who tested positive for marijuana (from fifty-five in 2013 to 115 
in 2018).153 The 2018 number represents roughly one person killed every three 
days.154 That result might be because a considerable number of Coloradans see 
 
LEGALIZATION IN COLO.: A REPORT PURSUANT TO SENATE BILL 13-283 (Oct. 2018); GOGEK, supra note 
1, at 117; DuPont, supra note 74, at 189. 
153  ROCKY MTN. HIDTA 2019 REPORT, supra note 149, at 5; see also, e.g., DuPont, supra note 
145, at 183–84; Julian Santaella-Tenorio et al., Association of Recreational Cannabis Laws in Colo-
rado and Washington State With Changes in Traffic Fatalities, 2005-2017, JAMA INTERNAL MED. 
(June 22, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/article-abstract/2767647 
(finding an increase in marijuana-related traffic fatalities in Colorado but not Washington State).  To 
be sure, other studies have concluded that legalization has not increased the number of crashes. See, 
e.g., Jayson D. Aydelotte, et al., Crash Fatality Rates after Recreational Marijuana Legalization in 
Washington and Colorado, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1329 (2017); Eric L. Sevigny, The Effects of Med-
ical Marijuana Laws on Cannabis-Involved Driving, 118 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 57 
(2018). That difference might be due to a nationwide drop in roadway fatalities due to fewer miles 
being driven during the pre-COVID-19 Great Recession. See Rosekind et al., supra note 144, at E1 
(“As pointed out by Santaella-Tenorio et al., prior research regarding the effects of recreational canna-
bis laws on traffic fatalities has been inconsistent. This is likely due, at least in part, to methodologic 
differences and variations in control for confounding variables. The period of time when these states 
enacted recreational cannabis laws was particularly challenging because of the extraordinary changes 
in the number of traffic deaths associated with the Great Recession. During the study periods for the 
Santaella-Tenorio et al. and Kamer et al. research (2005-2017), the number of traffic deaths nationwide 
dropped by more than 25%, and fatality counts in the 4 states under investigation had fluctuations 
between 18% and 30%.”). 
154  ROCKY MTN. HIDTA 2019 REPORT, supra note 149, at 5. 
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nothing wrong with driving shortly after consuming THC,155 which reflects a rather 
cavalier attitude toward public safety.156 
Washington State also legalized the recreational use of cannabis in 2012, and 
the data involving the THC-positive drivers involved in a fatal crash is quite 
troubling. A recent study by the American Automobile Association Foundation for 
Traffic Safety found that twenty-one percent of all drivers involved in a fatal crash 
in 2017 tested positive for THC.157 In addition, the proportion of drivers involved in 
a fatal crash who tested positive for THC is twice what that number was before the 
state legalized recreational-use marijuana.158 To be sure, the study noted, correctly, 
that the presence of a detectable amount of THC in a driver’s blood does not prove 
that he was under its influence at the time of the crash.159 Nonetheless, the 
psychotropic effect of THC on a driver and the 100 percent increase in fatal-crash-
involved drivers a reasonable inference that the state’s 2012 has contributed to the 
increase in roadway deaths. 
This is an urgent public health problem.160 The federal agencies concerned with 
roadway safety—such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and 
 
155  A recent Colorado Department of Transportation report confirms that attitude among many 
Colorado drivers. See COLO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FY 2020 REPORT, THE CANNABIS CONVERSATION 5 
(2020), https://www.codot.gov/safety/alcohol-and-impaired-driving/druggeddriving/assets/2020/can-
nabis-conversation-report_april-2020.pdf (“People who consume cannabis more often consider driving 
under the influence of marijuana to be less dangerous . . . . Many daily users considered driving under 
the influence of cannabis to be safe, and some even told us they drove better after using cannabis 
because they were calmer. Yet others were very cautious and took extra precautions when driving after 
using cannabis.”). In 2018, eighty-three drivers tested positive for THC in their blood—and therefore 
in their brain—rather than for a non-psychoactive marijuana ingredient. Id. at 9. That finding indicates 
that the driver used marijuana only hours before getting behind the wheel. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The 
Problem of “Driving While Stoned” Demands an Aggressive Public Policy Response, 11 J. DRUG 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2018) [hereinafter Larkin, “Driving While Stoned”] (“An anonymous November 
2017 Colorado Department of Transportation survey concluded that 69 percent of respondents admitted 
to driving while ‘high’ from marijuana within the prior year, 55 percent said that driving under the 
influence of marijuana was safe, and 55 percent of that group said that they had driven while high an 
average of 12 times in the prior 30 days.”) (footnote omitted); see also DuPont, supra note 145, at 190–
91. 
156  Larkin, “Driving While Stoned,” supra note 155, at 4 (“The one word that best describes 
those results is ‘scary.’”). 
157  See B.C. TEFFT & L.S. ARNOLD, CANNABIS USE AMONG DRIVERS IN FATAL CRASHES IN 
WASHINGTON STATE BEFORE AND AFTER LEGALIZATION, AM. AUTO. ASS’N, FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC 
SAFETY, RESEARCH BRIEF (2020). 
158  Id. 
159  Id. at 3. 
160  See Russell S. Kamer et al., Change in Traffic Fatality Rates in the First 4 States to Legalize 
Recreational Marijuana, JAMA INTERNAL MED. E1-E2 (June 22, 2020), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/article-abstract/2767643 (“[L]egalization of 
recreational marijuana is associated with increased traffic fatality rates. Applying these results to 
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the National Transportation Safety Board—agree. 161 So, too, does the White House 
Office of National Drug Control Policy. In 2010, it concluded that drugged driving 
poses as great a threat to roadway safety as alcohol-impaired driving and demands 
an “equivalent” response from the government and society.162 There is a consensus 
that drugged driving is a matter of national concern and that the state legalization 
measures will only worsen that problem. 
Any effort to remedy that problem has two hurdles to overcome that, so far, 
have been insurmountable. A large body of data establishes that a blood-alcohol 
concentration of 0.08 grams per deciliter impairs a drive’s ability to drive safely, and 
there are reliable, easily administered, non-invasive roadside testing devices that can 
measure that amount, such as Breathalyzers.163 Unfortunately, we do not and cannot 
know what concentration of THC in the blood (and therefore in the brain) renders 
someone incapable of driving safely because (for example) people develop a 
tolerance to THC, requiring a greater amount of THC to achieve the same 
psychoactive effect.164 Even if we knew what that amount is, we do not have an 
accurate, easily administrable roadside testing device.165 Nonetheless, there are 
 
national driving statistics, nationwide legalization would be associated with 6800 (95% CI, 4200-9700) 
excess roadway deaths each year.”). 
161  See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DRUG-IMPAIRED 
DRIVING, https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drug-impaired-driving (last accessed June 22, 2020); 
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 808 939, MARIJUANA, AL-
COHOL AND ACTUAL DRIVING PERFORMANCE 4–15 (1999); Heidi King, Deputy Dir., Nat’l Highway 
Safety Admin., DUID: A Vision for the Future (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nhtsa.gov/speeches-
presentations/duid-vision-future; Planes, Trains, and Automobiles: Operating While Stoned: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th 
Cong. 9 (2014) (statement of Hon. Christopher Hart, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety 
Bd.); id. at 24–25 (statement of Jeffrey P. Michael, Assoc. Adm’r of Research & Program Develop-
ment, National Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (NHTSA), U.S. Dep’t of Transp.); id. at 42 (statement 
of Patrice M. Kelly, Acting Dir., Office of Drug & Alcohol Policy and Compliance, U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp.); id. at 43 (statement of Ronald Flegel, Dir., Division of Workplace Programs, Center for Sub-
stance Abuse Prevention, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs.). 
162  OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2010, at 23 (2010) 
[hereinafter ONDCP 2010]. 
163  See, e.g., HERB MOSKOWITZ & CHRISTOPHER D. ROBINSON, EFFECTS OF LOW DOSES OF AL-
COHOL ON DRIVING RELATED SKILLS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE, DOT HS 807 280 (July 1988); MON-
ROE B. SNYDER, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADM’N, DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE: A REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL LIMITS, DOT HS 807 879 (Oct. 1992). 
164  Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 28, at 485–87. 
165  Larkin, “Driving While Stoned”, supra note 155, at 2–3; Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra 
note 28, at 481–88.  There are some in the works, but none has yet reached the same level of acceptance 
as Breathalyzers. 
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measures that states and Congress can and should take to address this issue.166 All 
that is necessary is the political will to do so. 
 
 
166  Some measures are the following: 
• Test every driver involved in a crash that results in a fatality or a serious injury (in-
cluding injury to pedestrians) for alcohol and impairing drugs, including marijuana, 
a panel of opioids, and prescription drugs. 
• Test every driver involved in a crash involving a fatality or serious injury for mari-
juana in every state with medical or recreational marijuana laws. 
• Test every driver arrested for driving while impaired for both alcohol and impairing 
drugs, including marijuana. 
• Apply to every driver under age twenty-one who tests positive for any illicit or im-
pairing drug, including marijuana and impairing prescription drugs, the same zero-
tolerance standard specified for alcohol, the use of which in this age group is illegal. 
• Apply to every driver found to have been impaired by drugs, including marijuana, 
the same remedies and penalties that are specified for alcohol-impaired drivers, in-
cluding administrative or judicial license revocation. 
• Require federal, state, and local law enforcement officers to use reliable oral fluid 
testing technology at the roadside for every driver arrested for impaired driving. 
• Authorize the creation of a national database similar to the National Crime Infor-
mation Center that collects the information for DWI program and policy decisions 
and that is accessible by state and local law enforcement officers. 
• Require states to collect/collate/publish alcohol/drug/polydrug data.  
• Require every state with medical or recreational marijuana laws to collect data on all 
crashes in which marijuana is suspected to have contributed to the crash and report 
that data to NHTSA. 
• Require every state to inform all people applying for a driver’s license and renewing 
a past license of all prescription drugs that can impair driving, as well as all illicit 
drugs. 
• Implement 24/7 Sobriety Programs in every area subject to federal jurisdiction. 
• Require that DWI recordkeeping separately classify alcohol, drugs, and polydrug 
use.  
• Lower the Blood-Alcohol Content Threshold from 0.08 g/dL to 0.05 (or lower) in 
every state that has authorized marijuana to be used for medical or recreational pur-
poses. 
• Have the relevant federal agencies—e.g., ONDCP, NHTSA, the National Institute 
on Drug Abuse, SAMHSA, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention—do 
the following: (1) identify each category of drug-impaired driving information that 
should be collected by the federal government, states, and localities; (2) identify each 
category of research that should be conducted collected by the federal government, 
states, and localities; and (3) define national standards regarding who should be 
tested in the case of a motor vehicle crash (e.g., fatally or seriously injured drivers, 
every driver) under what conditions testing should be done (e.g., fatality, serious in-
jury, drunk driving arrest, suspicion of driving while impaired by drugs or alcohol), 
what should be measured (e.g., which drugs and metabolites), and how testing should 
be done. 
Larkin, “Driving While Stoned”, supra note 155, at 4; Larkin, Jr., DuPont & Madras, supra note 140, 
at 4–5. For other options, see ONDCP 2010, supra note 162, at 24; GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY 
ASS’N, DRUG-IMPAIRED DRIVING: A GUIDE FOR STATES (Apr. 2017); ED WOOD, WEAKEST IN THE NA-
TION 90–96 (2018). 
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* * * * * 
 
Here is the bottom line: The combination of marijuana and motor vehicles can 
only lead to trouble. Legalizing recreational marijuana use will increase the number 
of roadway crashes, serious injuries, and deaths. Numerous government agencies, as 
well as private organizations and parties have expressed that concern.167 Whether 
Congress continues to nibble around the edges of reconsidering the CSA or decides 
to “go big or go home,” Congress must consider that consequence as part of any re-
evaluation of marijuana regulation. Lives are at stake. As I have explained 
elsewhere: 
Like the debate over marijuana legalization, the challenge to the 
constitutionality and morality of capital punishment has been the subject of vigorous 
dispute for the last several decades. One of the most common and powerful 
arguments advanced against the death penalty is that the criminal justice system is 
so riddled with flaws that there is an unacceptable risk that an innocent person will 
be executed. In any event, the argument goes, the difference between who lives and 
dies is entirely arbitrary. 
Ironically, the adoption of medical and recreational marijuana schemes poses 
the same risk of killing the innocent. Yet, we do not see any discussion of this cost 
of reform of the nation’s marijuana laws, let alone any outcry against liberalization 
that it will cost innocent lives. It is time that we should. 
There should be little doubt that the existence of medical and recreational 
marijuana schemes increases the risk of highway morbidity and mortality. Logic 
 
167  Numerous government agencies, as well as private organizations and parties have expressed 
that concern. See, e.g., SAMHSA, MARIJUANA RISKS supra note 120; BRIAN C. TEFFT ET AL., AAA, 
FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, PREVALENCE OF MARIJUANA INVOLVEMENT IN FATAL CRASHES: WASH-
INGTON, 2010-2014 (2016); AAA, FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, CANNABIS USE AMONG DRIVERS SUS-
PECTED OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OR INVOLVED IN COLLISIONS: ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON 
STATE PATROL DATA (2016); NIDA, MARIJUANA, supra note 85, at 11 (“THC also disrupts functioning 
of the cerebellum and basal ganglia, brain areas that regulate balance, posture, coordination, and reac-
tion time. This is the reason people who have used marijuana may not be able to drive safely.”); Letter 
from Director Nora D. Volkow, in NIDA, MARIJUANA, supra note 85, at 3 (“Because marijuana impairs 
short-term memory and judgment and distorts perception it can . . . make it dangerous to drive.”); U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGFACTS: DRUGGED DRIVING 2 
(2014) (“Considerable evidence from both real and simulated driving studies indicates that marijuana 
can negatively affect a driver’s attentiveness, perception of time and speed, and ability to draw on 
information obtained from past experiences.”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 25, at 15; GOGEK, 
supra note 1, at 187 (“Marijuana does not kill by overdose, but it is deadly behind the wheel.”); ROOM 
ET AL., supra note 25, at 18–19 (“Better-controlled epidemiological studies have recently supplied 
credible evidence that cannabis users who drive while intoxicated are at increased risk of motor vehicle 
crashes[.]”); D. Mark Anderson et al., Medical Marijuana Laws, Traffic Fatalities, and Alcohol Con-
sumption, 56 J. OF L. & ECON. 333 (2013); Ed Wood, Skydiving without a Parachute, 4 J. ADDICTION 
MED. & THERAPY 1020 (2016); see generally Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 28, at 476–77 (col-
lecting studies). But see NHTSA, DRUG AND ALCOHOL CRASH RISK: A CASE-CONTROL STUDY, REPORT 
NO. DOT HS 812-355, 67 (2016) (finding no significant increase in crash risk attributable to marijuana 
in one study of drivers in Virginia). 
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compels that conclusion. Eliminating criminal penalties for marijuana possession 
and use will entice some new number of people to use marijuana who avoided it 
because it had been a crime. Some number of those people will drive after becoming 
impaired. In turn, some number of those people will contribute to an accident, 
perhaps one involving a fatality. It certainly is the case that a legislature could decide 
that marijuana liberalization will lead to an increase in marijuana use and therefore 
decide to allocate any burden on the party—the marijuana user—who increases the 
risk of morbidity and mortality to deter people from using marijuana and driving. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The result is this: adoption of medical and recreational marijuana initiatives 
poses the risk of killing entirely innocent parties, whether they are other motorists, 
passengers, or pedestrians, in a purely random manner. Those people are no less 
innocent, and no less dead, than the hypothetical individual who is wrongfully 
convicted of a capital crime and executed. That omission deserves especial blame in 
the case of increased recreational use of marijuana. Whatever benefit marijuana may 
offer the people who smoke it, it cannot save lives. It can, however, take them.168 
 
IV. THE EFFECT OF RECONSIDERING FEDERAL MARIJUANA REGULATION 
 
Congress could intervene with a new federal regulatory program, but it cannot 
wait forever to do so. We are approaching the point at which the momentum toward 
leaving the issue to the states might become too overwhelming to stop it and change 
course in favor of a stricter federal regulatory plan.169 Moreover, “the larger the state-
legal cannabis markets become, the greater the political power of cannabis 
vendors.”170 They, along with would-be distributors, will fight any effort to keep 
them from becoming rich. 
Nonetheless, the gravitational force that draws politicians toward the option of 
kicking down the road difficult choices that could make enemies today—as well as 
the fact that the two major political parties cannot even agree on what day today is—
leaves me pessimistic that we will see Congress reconsider the CSA any time soon. 
 
168  Larkin, “Driving While Stoned”, supra note 155, at 5 (emphasis in original). I realize that 
legislators regularly make decisions with life-or-death consequences. My point is that the decision to 
legalize marijuana for recreational use fits into that category, not that it is unique. 
169  “The window of opportunity for such policies [other than unrestricted commercialization] 
will not remain open for many more years.”  Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health, supra note 23, at 
83. 
170  Id.; see also, e.g., Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 355–56 & nn.99–100 (collecting 
estimates that large-scale commercialized marijuana would earn industry participants billions in reve-
nue); Kelly Beaucar Vlahos, Cannabis Goes Corporate, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Apr. 15, 2014, 12:05 
AM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/fear-the-rise-of-big-pot/ (describing legaliza-
tion as “the country’s 21st century gold rush”). 
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Instead, Congress will enact a series of small-scale reforms that do not separately or 
collectively rejigger the CSA in a dramatic manner, but that over time make it clear 
which way the law is moving. 
Why? Legislation involves making choices, which generates friends and 
enemies, and making compromises, which generates winners and losers. Today, 
however, enemies and losers treat the people responsible for their predicament 
(figuratively at least) in much the same way that Herodias and King Herod treated 
John the Baptist.171 Few elected officials volunteer for that role. The CSA therefore 
might celebrate at least a few more birthdays. 
Which brings up this question: Is that a good or bad outcome? I am not sure 
that I can answer that question, certainly not across the board. Yet, I can say this. 
Legalization is not necessary to make marijuana available; ask any DEA agent.172 
Legalization would put marijuana in the same category as tobacco and alcohol—
“disfavored” products, according to Professor Richard Epstein,173 or “temptation 
goods,” in the words of Professor Caulkins174—that we regulate rather than ban 
because we are not willing to endure the enforcement costs of outlawing their sale. 
That concession to reality, however, comes at a price. Legalization will lead to 
commercialization and all of the collateral consequences that follow. For example, 
in theory, Congress should be able to allow parties to sell cannabis only if they do 
not advertise its availability. Congress prohibited the advertising of cigarettes over 
radio and television in 1971,175 and the Supreme Court upheld that law over a Free 
Speech Clause challenge.176 Moreover, a law that permits an activity traditionally 
deemed a “vice” to be undertaken as long as its purveyors do not advertise would be 
a classic case for application of the argument that the greater power to ban a product 
altogether includes the lesser power to prohibit only advertising it.177 Unfortunately, 
 
171  Mark 6:14-29 (King James). 
172  See 2019 DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 77 (Dec. 
2019) (“As the most commonly used illicit drug . . . marijuana is widely available and cultivated in all 
50 states.”). 
173  Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 65–66 (1988). 
174  See Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra note 23, at 33. 
175  The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2019). 
176  Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C.C. 1971), summarily aff’d sub 
nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
177  See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (“In our view, 
the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban ad-
vertising of casino gambling . . . .”); Epstein, supra note 173, at 65–66. Professor Epstein argued that 
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ceive deference from the courts. Id. at 65. “Surely if the issue were the legalization of marijuana and 
other drugs, a respectable argument could be made to allow their sale, subject to a general tax and to 
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we might not have that option available if Congress allows private parties to be 
distributors, given the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to endorse a “greater includes 
the lesser” theory in connection with the advertising of products or services we once 
categorized as “vices.”178 That option would be available to Congress, however, if it 
required states to own each component of the vertically integrated cultivation, 
processing, and distribution processes, or at least the last one, rather than allow 
private parties to do so, as it now happens in states that have legalized recreational 
marijuana use.179 The reason is that Congress has the authority to forbid marijuana 
distribution altogether,180 and states qua states do not possess First Amendment 
rights,181 so Congress can condition its approval on a state’s agreement not to 
advertise.182 That fact alone strongly militates in favor of a state ownership plan. 
A state-run system has several additional advantages over a for-profit or not-
for-profit system. State ownership of distribution stores would make it easier for a 
state to monitor marijuana sales (and employees) to prevent unauthorized 
distribution to minors and to the black market. State ownership would help avoid the 
problems that arise whenever the law permits only one particular business form—
such as not-for-profit concerns—to participate in an activity, even though the 
members of the industry prefer other forms—such as for-profit concerns. 
Corporation law is largely within the bailiwick of the states to devise,183 and there is 
a risk that particular states might bend their own laws to encourage or enable parties 
to obscure the true ownership of a not-for-profit enterprise. That risk might be slight, 
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reasonably easy to enforce.” Id. at 65–66. 
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83 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 & n.20 (1996); and Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1995) (all rejecting a “greater-includes-the-lesser” argument for 
commercial speech cases based on Posadas in favor of a multi-factor analysis adopted in Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
179  See Unlocked Potential?: Small Businesses in the Cannabis Industry, Hearing Before the 
House Small Business Committee, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Paul J. Larkin, Jr., recommending 
state ownership). 
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183  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. FDIC, 140 S. Ct. 713, 718 (2020) (“Corporations are generally crea-
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but there is little or no risk of such legal chicanery if the state itself must own the 
cannabis distribution business.184 
Regardless, Congress’s ability to keep states from advertising alone justifies a 
state ownership requirement. Congress also has the authority to adopt such a 
requirement. Congress appropriates funds for interstate highway construction, and 
it can place reasonable conditions on the receipt of those funds.185 In any event, 
Congress can regulate the interstate and intrastate distribution of cannabis under the 
Commerce Clause.186 
If Congress were to amend the CSA to permit recreational use of marijuana, the 
issue whether cannabis should be available for medical use would essentially go 
away. Anyone who wanted to use it to alleviate discomfort from a malady of some 
type could purchase it without the need to go through the charade that we have seen 
states wink at in connection with their medical marijuana programs: a patient 
pretends to have a serious illness, a physician pretends to offer him a serious 
recommendation, a dispensary pretends to sell a serious medicament, and the 
legislature pretends not to know that what is going on. That is a serious example of 
hypocrisy and confirms the adage that hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to 
virtue.187 It is also a new version of what has been termed the “Victorian 
Compromise”—viz., the difference between what the law strictly forbids when 
defining formal public morality and what the law studiously ignores as acceptable 
for wholly private conduct.188 Allowing cannabis to be sold for recreational use 
would eliminate the need to engage in the pretense that state elected officials have 
pursued for more than 20 years and that federal elected and appointed officials (the 
attorneys general and FDA commissioners for the last four presidents have their 
hands dirty too) have studiously ignored for the same time. 
That alone would be a boon to society. At a time when lies rain down daily 
from elected officials onto the public like a monsoon in full swing, eliminating even 
a portion of the deceit that is the standard fare in public debate would be refreshing. 
No longer would elected officials need to hide behind the fig leaf that smokable or 
 
184  States ownership also might not have the same banking problems that for-profit and not-for-
profit business would have with using the national banking system for receipts from the sale of mari-
juana. Banks that accept deposits from private businesses selling marijuana in violation of the CSA 
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laws to address the problems resulting from the operation of a large-scale cash business. The fewer 
statutes modified, the lesser the risk of unintended statutory consequences. 
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187  See Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 28, at 511–14 & nn.275, 279 & 282–83. 
188  Id. at 510. 
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edible cannabis is “Good for what ails you!” as a disguise for doing what the 
supporters of the original California Compassionate Use Act really wanted: 
legalization of marijuana for recreational use.189 Of course, that honesty might last 
no longer than a winter sunset, but any little bit helps. 
What is more, the FDA would be in a position to act against mountebanks 
claiming that cannabis possesses magical medicinal properties that it lacks. To be 
sure, the FDA has issued warning letters to companies that have sold products with 
constituents of marijuana that have claimed their product can treat diseases such as 
cancer or Alzheimer’s.190 The FDA, however, has not aggressively sought to halt the 
sale of cannabis under the banner of a medical treatment, possibly because the FDA 
chose not to become a combatant in (and therefore a casualty of) the “Marijuana 
Wars.”191 Yet, if the FDA’s enforcement of the food192 and drug laws would not 
prevent someone from obtaining marijuana as part of a recreational marijuana 
program, perhaps the agency would be less reluctant to use its authority to prevent 
fraudulent medical claims by dispensaries and reassert its leadership role in the 
protection of the public against snake oil salesmen. At least, it would be worth a 
shot.193 
There is an additional, powerful benefit from a renewed, formal FDA 
declaration, backed up by enforcement actions, that smoking or swallowing the 
crude, plant form of marijuana has no legitimate therapeutic use. It would tell 
adolescents that the marijuana industry and states with medical or recreational 
marijuana programs have flimflammed them for twenty-plus years by claiming that 
marijuana is not dangerous. Over the last decade, the perception among high school 
students that marijuana is harmful has steadily declined, which might explain why 
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http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/30/opinion/marijuana-for-the-sick.html (“Supporters of the Califor-
nia measure did their cause no good by immediately lighting up marijuana cigarettes after it passed last 
month and proclaiming that a legitimate medicinal use would include smoking a joint to relieve stress. 
Dennis Peron, originator of the California initiative, said afterward, ‘I believe all marijuana use is med-
ical—except for kids.’ These actions made it obvious that the goal of at least some supporters is to get 
marijuana legalized outright, a proposition that opinion polls indicate most Americans reject.”). 
190  See Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22, at 374–77. 
191  See id. at 349–58. 
192  Marijuana edibles poses separate but also potentially serious problems. See, e.g., Monte et 
al., supra note 124, at 242; see generally Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 22. 
193  As University of Pennsylvania Medical School Professor David Casarett has argued: “So if 
medical marijuana is going to be widely legal—and it certainly looks as though that’s the trend—then 
these clinics and dispensaries are going to have to do much better. They’re profiting off the legalization 
of medical marijuana as an officially sanctioned ‘drug,’ which is fine. But clinics and dispensaries need 
to be held to the same standards of quality control and oversight and education to which we hold med-
ical pharmacies and clinics. Medical marijuana is becoming too widespread, and the risks are too great, 
to leave the patient to fend for herself, and let the buyer beware.” CASARETT, supra note 73, at 212–13; 
see also, e.g., BEARMAN & PETTINATO, supra note 73, at 15 (“Dispensaries need to be professional just 
as pharmacies are today.”). 
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3,700 adolescents between twelve and seventeen became first-time marijuana users 
every day in 2018.194 That fact is troubling. Science has concluded that long-term 
marijuana use starting during adolescence over time creates serious adverse health 
risks.195 That is one reason why there is no debate over the issue whether minors 
should have access to recreational marijuana use, no state allows it, and no advocate 
for liberalization supports it. 
Yet, that is not how adolescents read the subtext of the state liberalization 
programs. Operating on the presumption that the federal and state governments 
would not allow anyone to market a quack remedy as a legitimate medicine, what 
minors have absorbed over the last two decades is the message that marijuana cannot 
be harmful because the federal and state governments allow businesses to claim that 
it has therapeutic purposes. That likely is one reason why adolescents do not see 
marijuana use as being dangerous.196 Whatever Congress decides to do, Congress 
needs to dispel that deceit clearly, firmly, and for all time. 
There is another lesson that adolescents need to unlearn: It is “normal and 
acceptable” to lie to get something you want.197 Adolescents know that marijuana 
distribution is generally illegal, but they see adults, physicians, and government 
officials conspire to take advantage of a phony medical marijuana loophole to evade 
the state penal code while breaking federal law. We normally attribute the “wink-
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wink-nod-nod” that comes with private and public corruption to the immoral 
behavior of a small number of dishonest individuals and government officials. State 
medical marijuana schemes, however, built that corruption into the very fabric of 
our laws. “There might be no better way to teach kids cynicism and distrust.”198 A 
world where dishonesty is commonly practiced by members of the public and 
unofficially blessed by senior officials in our political branches is a world where the 
difference between being guilty and innocent turns on who gets caught. We should 




Congress passed the CSA at a time when every state prohibited the distribution 
of marijuana. In 1996, however, legalization advocates persuaded Californians to 
allow people barely on this side of the River Styx to use marijuana to alleviate their 
suffering while winking at the reality that the 1996 measure was a thinly veiled effort 
to legalize recreational marijuana use. Since then, the debate over marijuana 
legalization has been filled with dishonesty and cowardice. Little has changed except 
for the birth of state recreational marijuana-use programs, which, if nothing else, at 
least have the benefit of candidly identifying their purpose. It is long past time for 
Congress to address the hypocrisy and confusion created by the disparity between 
federal and state law. 
If Congress does, it should make pellucid that the FDA has the prerogative to 
decide what drugs are safe, effective, and pure. Congress should also emphasize that 
state laws making any claim to the contrary not only are invalid under the Supremacy 
Clause, but also offer marijuana distributors the same legal protection against 
administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement that an empty net gives a hockey 
team. The FDA then should take up the responsibility it has willfully neglected of 
protecting the public, especially juveniles and pregnant women, against the 
beguiling but deceitful claims of anyone who alleges that smoking marijuana is a 
legitimate therapeutic medicine. Otherwise, those elected and appointed officials 
will be morally responsible for the physical and psychological harms that marijuana 
will cause individuals whose use begins during their minority and continues well 
into their adulthood. 
If Congress were to legalize recreational use marijuana, Congress should 
address the inevitable harmful sequelae of that decision. One of them would be an 
increase in roadway crashes, injuries, and fatalities caused by a larger number of 
people who use marijuana and drive. For decades now, the nation has sought to 
lower the carnage caused by people who drink and drive. Public and private efforts 
to stop that conduct have successfully driven down the number of alcohol-caused 
crashes. Legalizing marijuana for recreational use will lead to an about-face in that 
effort. There will be an increase in marijuana use, some users will get behind the 
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wheel, and some drivers who are “one toke over the line” will cause a crash that 
injures or kills innocent drivers, passengers, or pedestrians. Legalizing marijuana 
use without also addressing that problem would be as irresponsible as ignoring the 
federal-state disparity in marijuana regulation. Congress should reconsider federal 
marijuana regulation, but it should do it responsibly. 
